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	<id>https://ideawaza.com/index.php?action=history&amp;feed=atom&amp;title=WebAuthn</id>
	<title>WebAuthn - Revision history</title>
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	<updated>2026-11-22T03:39:19Z</updated>
	<subtitle>Revision history for this page on the wiki</subtitle>
	<generator>MediaWiki 1.46.2</generator>
	<entry>
		<id>https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120386&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Waza: Cleanup: remove deletion notice and missing templates</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120386&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-03T22:43:53Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Cleanup: remove deletion notice and missing templates&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw-interface=&quot;&quot;&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 22:43, 3 November 2026&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l1&quot;&gt;Line 1:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 1:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;{{Short description|Public-key authentication standard}}&lt;/del&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-added&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{About|the W3C standard|passwordless authentication credential|Passkey (credential)|other methods of authentication used on the web|Authentication#In computer science}}&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{About|the W3C standard|passwordless authentication credential|Passkey (credential)|other methods of authentication used on the web|Authentication#In computer science}}&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;!-- Please do not remove or change this AfD message until the discussion has been closed. --&amp;gt;&lt;/del&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-added&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;{{Article for deletion/dated|page=WebAuthn|timestamp=20261103111629|year=2026|month=November|day=3|substed=yes|help=off|outcome=merging|target=Passkey}}&lt;/del&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-added&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;!-- Once discussion is closed, please place on talk page: {{Old AfD multi|page=WebAuthn|date=3 November 2026|result=&#039;&#039;&#039;keep&#039;&#039;&#039;}} --&amp;gt;&lt;/del&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-added&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;!-- End of AfD message, feel free to edit beyond this point --&amp;gt;&lt;/del&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-added&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{Technical|date=February 2024}}&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{Technical|date=February 2024}}&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2023}}&lt;/del&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-added&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox technology standard&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{Infobox technology standard&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;| title = Web Authentication&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;| title = Web Authentication&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Waza</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120385&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>Waza: 339 revisions imported: Import with full history</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120385&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-03T22:43:27Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;339 revisions imported: Import with full history&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw-interface=&quot;&quot;&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;1&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 22:43, 3 November 2026&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-notice&quot; lang=&quot;en&quot;&gt;&lt;div class=&quot;mw-diff-empty&quot;&gt;(No difference)&lt;/div&gt;
&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Waza</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120384&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>wikipedia&gt;Citation bot: Altered journal. Add: authors 1-1. Removed parameters. Some additions/deletions were parameter name changes. | Use this bot. Report bugs. | Suggested by GoingBatty | Category:CS1 errors: dates | #UCB_template | Whitelisted category 1231/2042</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120384&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-03T19:24:16Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Altered journal. Add: authors 1-1. Removed parameters. Some additions/deletions were parameter name changes. | &lt;a href=&quot;/index.php?title=En:WP:UCB&amp;amp;action=edit&amp;amp;redlink=1&quot; class=&quot;new&quot; title=&quot;En:WP:UCB (page does not exist)&quot;&gt;Use this bot&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;a href=&quot;/index.php?title=En:WP:DBUG&amp;amp;action=edit&amp;amp;redlink=1&quot; class=&quot;new&quot; title=&quot;En:WP:DBUG (page does not exist)&quot;&gt;Report bugs&lt;/a&gt;. | Suggested by GoingBatty | &lt;a href=&quot;/index.php?title=Category:CS1_errors:_dates&amp;amp;action=edit&amp;amp;redlink=1&quot; class=&quot;new&quot; title=&quot;Category:CS1 errors: dates (page does not exist)&quot;&gt;Category:CS1 errors: dates&lt;/a&gt; | #UCB_template | Whitelisted category 1231/2042&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw-interface=&quot;&quot;&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 19:24, 3 November 2026&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l56&quot;&gt;Line 56:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 56:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;== Background ==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;== Background ==&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The combination of username and password has been the standard mechanism for users to prove to a website that they are a specific person since the dawn of web-based services.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Bonneau|first1=Joseph|last2=Herley|first2=Cormac|last3=Oorschot|first3=Paul C. van|last4=Stajano|first4=Frank|chapter=The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes |date=2012|title=2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy|pages=553–567|doi=10.1109/SP.2012.44 |bibcode=2012sp...conf...46B |isbn=978-1-4673-1244-8 }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, password-based authentication has been known to be flawed for many years, even decades, with most issues relating to poor practices on either the user side or the server side. Users routinely reuse passwords across services (which exposes them to [[credential stuffing]]),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Wang|first1=Chun|last2=Jan|first2=Steve T.K.|last3=Hu|first3=Hang|last4=Bossart|first4=Douglas|last5=Wang|first5=Gang|title=Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy |chapter=The Next Domino to Fall: Empirical Analysis of User Passwords across Online Services |date=2018-03-13 |language=en|publisher=ACM|pages=196–203|doi=10.1145/3176258.3176332|isbn=978-1-4503-5632-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; choose weak passwords that can be brute-forced and predicted in a short amount of time&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Mazurek|first1=Michelle L.|last2=Komanduri|first2=Saranga|last3=Vidas|first3=Timothy|last4=Bauer|first4=Lujo|last5=Christin|first5=Nicolas|last6=Cranor|first6=Lorrie Faith|last7=Kelley|first7=Patrick Gage|last8=Shay|first8=Richard|last9=Ur|first9=Blase|title=Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer &amp;amp; communications security - CCS &#039;13 |chapter=Measuring password guessability for an entire university |date=2013 |language=en|publisher=ACM Press|pages=173–186|doi=10.1145/2508859.2516726|isbn=978-1-4503-2477-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, and store them in insecure ways that allows for their disclosure (for example writing them down on a piece of paper or a document),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite conference|publisher=USENIX Association|isbn=978-1-939133-10-6|pages=13–30|last1=Habib|first1=Hana|last2=Naeini|first2=Pardis Emami|last3=Devlin|first3=Summer|last4=Oates|first4=Maggie|last5=Swoopes|first5=Chelse|last6=Bauer|first6=Lujo|last7=Christin|first7=Nicolas|last8=Cranor|first8=Lorrie Faith|title=User behaviors and attitudes under password expiration policies|location=Baltimore, MD|date=2018|conference=Fourteenth Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2018)|book-title=}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; with each of those contributing to the likelihood of credentials and account compromise. Likewise, servers often deal with passwords improperly, both while storing them in [[Database|databases]], and while processing them. Flaws include plain-text storage, lack of [[Salt (cryptography)|salted]] [[Hash (cryptography)|hashing]] (or more advanced schemes for at-rest credentials),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Password Storage - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series |url=https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html |access-date=2026-11-01 |website=cheatsheetseries.owasp.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; arbitrary restrictions on password length and [[charset]], mandatory ineffective password changes, and deliberate incompatibility with [[Password manager|password managers]] (for instance, by preventing passwords to be pasted).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite journal |&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;last&lt;/del&gt;=Lee |&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;first&lt;/del&gt;=Kevin |last2=Sjöberg |first2=Sten |last3=Narayanan |first3=Arvind |date=2022 |title=Password policies of most top websites fail to follow best practices |url=https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2022/presentation/lee |journal=&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;SOUPS &lt;/del&gt;&#039;22 |language=en |pages=561–580 |isbn=978-1-939133-30-4}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The combination of username and password has been the standard mechanism for users to prove to a website that they are a specific person since the dawn of web-based services.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Bonneau|first1=Joseph|last2=Herley|first2=Cormac|last3=Oorschot|first3=Paul C. van|last4=Stajano|first4=Frank|chapter=The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes |date=2012|title=2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy|pages=553–567|doi=10.1109/SP.2012.44 |bibcode=2012sp...conf...46B |isbn=978-1-4673-1244-8 }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, password-based authentication has been known to be flawed for many years, even decades, with most issues relating to poor practices on either the user side or the server side. Users routinely reuse passwords across services (which exposes them to [[credential stuffing]]),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Wang|first1=Chun|last2=Jan|first2=Steve T.K.|last3=Hu|first3=Hang|last4=Bossart|first4=Douglas|last5=Wang|first5=Gang|title=Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy |chapter=The Next Domino to Fall: Empirical Analysis of User Passwords across Online Services |date=2018-03-13 |language=en|publisher=ACM|pages=196–203|doi=10.1145/3176258.3176332|isbn=978-1-4503-5632-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; choose weak passwords that can be brute-forced and predicted in a short amount of time&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Mazurek|first1=Michelle L.|last2=Komanduri|first2=Saranga|last3=Vidas|first3=Timothy|last4=Bauer|first4=Lujo|last5=Christin|first5=Nicolas|last6=Cranor|first6=Lorrie Faith|last7=Kelley|first7=Patrick Gage|last8=Shay|first8=Richard|last9=Ur|first9=Blase|title=Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer &amp;amp; communications security - CCS &#039;13 |chapter=Measuring password guessability for an entire university |date=2013 |language=en|publisher=ACM Press|pages=173–186|doi=10.1145/2508859.2516726|isbn=978-1-4503-2477-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, and store them in insecure ways that allows for their disclosure (for example writing them down on a piece of paper or a document),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite conference|publisher=USENIX Association|isbn=978-1-939133-10-6|pages=13–30|last1=Habib|first1=Hana|last2=Naeini|first2=Pardis Emami|last3=Devlin|first3=Summer|last4=Oates|first4=Maggie|last5=Swoopes|first5=Chelse|last6=Bauer|first6=Lujo|last7=Christin|first7=Nicolas|last8=Cranor|first8=Lorrie Faith|title=User behaviors and attitudes under password expiration policies|location=Baltimore, MD|date=2018|conference=Fourteenth Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2018)|book-title=}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; with each of those contributing to the likelihood of credentials and account compromise. Likewise, servers often deal with passwords improperly, both while storing them in [[Database|databases]], and while processing them. Flaws include plain-text storage, lack of [[Salt (cryptography)|salted]] [[Hash (cryptography)|hashing]] (or more advanced schemes for at-rest credentials),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Password Storage - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series |url=https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html |access-date=2026-11-01 |website=cheatsheetseries.owasp.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; arbitrary restrictions on password length and [[charset]], mandatory ineffective password changes, and deliberate incompatibility with [[Password manager|password managers]] (for instance, by preventing passwords to be pasted).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite journal |&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;last1&lt;/ins&gt;=Lee |&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;first1&lt;/ins&gt;=Kevin |last2=Sjöberg |first2=Sten |last3=Narayanan |first3=Arvind |date=2022 |title=Password policies of most top websites fail to follow best practices |url=https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2022/presentation/lee |journal=&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;Soups &lt;/ins&gt;&#039;22 |language=en |pages=561–580 |isbn=978-1-939133-30-4}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;As a result, in 2012, [[Google]] alongside [[Yubico]] started working on a standard called [[Universal 2nd Factor|Universal 2 Factor]] (U2F)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Yubico Company Timeline|url=https://www.yubico.com/why-yubico/yubico-innovation-history/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that would allow websites to programmatically verify a second-factor about the user by verifying the presence of hardware-based tokens (like [[smart card]]s) on the user. This standard was considered an improvement over existing solutions like time-based [[one-time password]] ([[TOTP - Time-based One-time Password Algorithm|TOTP]]) or SMS-based authentication that still left the user vulnerable to sophisticated [[phishing]] campaigns. The standard was later adopted into a larger industry-wide collaboration called the [[FIDO Alliance|FIDO (Fast IDentity Online) Alliance]]. The first draft for this proposed standard was published in 2014.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2014-12-09|title=FIDO Alliance Publishes Final FIDO 1.0 Specifications, First Industry Standards for Universal Strong Authentication|url=https://www.yubico.com/press-releases/fido-alliance-publishes-final-fido-1-0-specifications-first-industry-standards-for-universal-strong-authentication/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2015, the FIDO Alliance started developing the [[FIDO2 Project|FIDO 2 Project]], releasing a proposed standard where they sought to improve upon the existing U2F standard by addressing many of its weaknesses.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2015-09-04|title=FIDO Complete Spec 2015-09-04|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20150904/FIDO-COMPLETE-v2.0-ps-20150904.pdf|access-date=5 June 2026|website=Fido Alliance}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For example, the U2F standard still required the use of passwords alongside a second factor which still left websites vulnerable to password leaks and other similar attacks that were common against passwords.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Ghorbani Lyastani|first1=Sanam|last2=Schilling|first2=Michael|last3=Neumayr|first3=Michaela|last4=Backes|first4=Michael|last5=Bugiel|first5=Sven|title=2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) |chapter=Is FIDO2 the Kingslayer of User Authentication? A Comparative Usability Study of FIDO2 Passwordless Authentication |date=May 2020 |publisher=IEEE|pages=268–285|doi=10.1109/SP40000.2020.00047|bibcode=2020sp...conf...24G |isbn=978-1-7281-3497-0}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Additionally, the U2F specification only verified the second factor device and did not perform any user authentication.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; This meant that if the second factor device had been stolen or lost anyone with access to the U2F device would be able to bypass the second factor of authentication for accounts linked to the device.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;As a result, in 2012, [[Google]] alongside [[Yubico]] started working on a standard called [[Universal 2nd Factor|Universal 2 Factor]] (U2F)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Yubico Company Timeline|url=https://www.yubico.com/why-yubico/yubico-innovation-history/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that would allow websites to programmatically verify a second-factor about the user by verifying the presence of hardware-based tokens (like [[smart card]]s) on the user. This standard was considered an improvement over existing solutions like time-based [[one-time password]] ([[TOTP - Time-based One-time Password Algorithm|TOTP]]) or SMS-based authentication that still left the user vulnerable to sophisticated [[phishing]] campaigns. The standard was later adopted into a larger industry-wide collaboration called the [[FIDO Alliance|FIDO (Fast IDentity Online) Alliance]]. The first draft for this proposed standard was published in 2014.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2014-12-09|title=FIDO Alliance Publishes Final FIDO 1.0 Specifications, First Industry Standards for Universal Strong Authentication|url=https://www.yubico.com/press-releases/fido-alliance-publishes-final-fido-1-0-specifications-first-industry-standards-for-universal-strong-authentication/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2015, the FIDO Alliance started developing the [[FIDO2 Project|FIDO 2 Project]], releasing a proposed standard where they sought to improve upon the existing U2F standard by addressing many of its weaknesses.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2015-09-04|title=FIDO Complete Spec 2015-09-04|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20150904/FIDO-COMPLETE-v2.0-ps-20150904.pdf|access-date=5 June 2026|website=Fido Alliance}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For example, the U2F standard still required the use of passwords alongside a second factor which still left websites vulnerable to password leaks and other similar attacks that were common against passwords.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot;&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Ghorbani Lyastani|first1=Sanam|last2=Schilling|first2=Michael|last3=Neumayr|first3=Michaela|last4=Backes|first4=Michael|last5=Bugiel|first5=Sven|title=2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) |chapter=Is FIDO2 the Kingslayer of User Authentication? A Comparative Usability Study of FIDO2 Passwordless Authentication |date=May 2020 |publisher=IEEE|pages=268–285|doi=10.1109/SP40000.2020.00047|bibcode=2020sp...conf...24G |isbn=978-1-7281-3497-0}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Additionally, the U2F specification only verified the second factor device and did not perform any user authentication.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt; This meant that if the second factor device had been stolen or lost anyone with access to the U2F device would be able to bypass the second factor of authentication for accounts linked to the device.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;:0&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l85&quot;&gt;Line 85:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 85:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Authenticator is a multi-factor [[Cryptography|cryptographic]] authenticator that uses [[Cryptography#Public-key cryptography|public-key cryptography]] to sign an authentication assertion targeted at the website. Assuming the authenticator uses either a [[Facial recognition system|facial recognition]], fingerprint or PIN for user verification, the authenticator itself is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you have&amp;#039;&amp;#039; while the facial recognition and fingerprint (biometric) are &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you are&amp;#039;&amp;#039; and the PIN is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you know&amp;#039;&amp;#039;.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Authenticator is a multi-factor [[Cryptography|cryptographic]] authenticator that uses [[Cryptography#Public-key cryptography|public-key cryptography]] to sign an authentication assertion targeted at the website. Assuming the authenticator uses either a [[Facial recognition system|facial recognition]], fingerprint or PIN for user verification, the authenticator itself is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you have&amp;#039;&amp;#039; while the facial recognition and fingerprint (biometric) are &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you are&amp;#039;&amp;#039; and the PIN is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you know&amp;#039;&amp;#039;.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;To initiate the authentication flow, the website indicates its intentions to the web browser via [[JavaScript]].&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Web_Authentication_API-1&quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web |url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |title=Web Authentication API |at=Section [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API#Authentication Authentication] |publisher=[[Mozilla]] |access-date=18 March 2019 |archive-date=28 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201128172824/https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |url-status=live }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The web browser communicates with the authenticator using a JavaScript [[API]] implemented in the browser.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Web_Authentication_API-1&quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;W3C-WebAuthn-Level-1&quot; /&amp;gt; A hardware authenticator in the user&#039;s possession  conforms to the FIDO [[Client to Authenticator Protocol]] (CTAP),&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;FIDO-CTAP&quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web |editor1-last=Brand |editor1-first=Christiaan |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Ehrensvärd |editor3-first=Jakob |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=Michael B. |editor5-last=Kumar |editor5-first=Akshay |editor6-last=Lindemann |editor6-first=Rolf |editor7-last=Powers |editor7-first=Adam |editor8-last=Verrept |editor8-first=Johan |title=Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) |url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |publisher=FIDO Alliance |access-date=7 March 2019 |date=30 January 2019 |archive-date=8 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190308081859/https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |url-status=dead }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and connects over [[USB]], [[Bluetooth Low Energy]], or [[near-field communications]] (NFC). WebAuthn however does not strictly require a hardware authenticator. A platform authenticator (i.e., an authenticator implemented directly on the web browser or operating system) can  be used.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite journal |&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;last&lt;/del&gt;=Vasileios Grammatopoulos |&lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;first&lt;/del&gt;=Athanasios |last2=Politis |first2=Ilias |last3=Xenakis |first3=Christos |date=2021-08-17 |title=A web tool for analyzing FIDO2/WebAuthn Requests and Responses |url=https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3465481.3469209 |journal=Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security |language=en |publisher=ACM |pages=1–10 |doi=10.1145/3465481.3469209 |isbn=978-1-4503-9051-4}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; If the user has registered their keys on a different device the WebAuthn 3 specification allows for the web browser to access credentials stored on another device without having to copy over the keys to the current device.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;To initiate the authentication flow, the website indicates its intentions to the web browser via [[JavaScript]].&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Web_Authentication_API-1&quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web |url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |title=Web Authentication API |at=Section [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API#Authentication Authentication] |publisher=[[Mozilla]] |access-date=18 March 2019 |archive-date=28 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201128172824/https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |url-status=live }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The web browser communicates with the authenticator using a JavaScript [[API]] implemented in the browser.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Web_Authentication_API-1&quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;W3C-WebAuthn-Level-1&quot; /&amp;gt; A hardware authenticator in the user&#039;s possession  conforms to the FIDO [[Client to Authenticator Protocol]] (CTAP),&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;FIDO-CTAP&quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web |editor1-last=Brand |editor1-first=Christiaan |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Ehrensvärd |editor3-first=Jakob |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=Michael B. |editor5-last=Kumar |editor5-first=Akshay |editor6-last=Lindemann |editor6-first=Rolf |editor7-last=Powers |editor7-first=Adam |editor8-last=Verrept |editor8-first=Johan |title=Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) |url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |publisher=FIDO Alliance |access-date=7 March 2019 |date=30 January 2019 |archive-date=8 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190308081859/https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |url-status=dead }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and connects over [[USB]], [[Bluetooth Low Energy]], or [[near-field communications]] (NFC). WebAuthn however does not strictly require a hardware authenticator. A platform authenticator (i.e., an authenticator implemented directly on the web browser or operating system) can  be used.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite journal |&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;last1&lt;/ins&gt;=Vasileios Grammatopoulos |&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;first1&lt;/ins&gt;=Athanasios |last2=Politis |first2=Ilias |last3=Xenakis |first3=Christos |date=2021-08-17 |title=A web tool for analyzing FIDO2/WebAuthn Requests and Responses |url=https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3465481.3469209 |journal=Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security |language=en |publisher=ACM |pages=1–10 |doi=10.1145/3465481.3469209 |isbn=978-1-4503-9051-4}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; If the user has registered their keys on a different device the WebAuthn 3 specification allows for the web browser to access credentials stored on another device without having to copy over the keys to the current device.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;===Registration===&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;===Registration===&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>wikipedia&gt;Citation bot</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120383&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>wikipedia&gt;PhotographyEdits: Nominated for merging; see :Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/WebAuthn.</title>
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		<updated>2026-11-03T11:16:29Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Nominated for merging; see &lt;a href=&quot;https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Articles_for_deletion/WebAuthn&quot; class=&quot;extiw&quot; title=&quot;wikipedia:Articles for deletion/WebAuthn&quot;&gt;Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/WebAuthn&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 11:16, 3 November 2026&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l1&quot;&gt;Line 1:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 1:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{Short description|Public-key authentication standard}}&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{Short description|Public-key authentication standard}}&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{About|the W3C standard|passwordless authentication credential|Passkey (credential)|other methods of authentication used on the web|Authentication#In computer science}}&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{About|the W3C standard|passwordless authentication credential|Passkey (credential)|other methods of authentication used on the web|Authentication#In computer science}}&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;!-- Please do not remove or change this AfD message until the discussion has been closed. --&amp;gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;{{Article for deletion/dated|page=WebAuthn|timestamp=20261103111629|year=2026|month=November|day=3|substed=yes|help=off|outcome=merging|target=Passkey}}&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;!-- Once discussion is closed, please place on talk page: {{Old AfD multi|page=WebAuthn|date=3 November 2026|result=&#039;&#039;&#039;keep&#039;&#039;&#039;}} --&amp;gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-side-deleted&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;!-- End of AfD message, feel free to edit beyond this point --&amp;gt;&lt;/ins&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{Technical|date=February 2024}}&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{Technical|date=February 2024}}&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2023}}&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;{{Use dmy dates|date=October 2023}}&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>wikipedia&gt;PhotographyEdits</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120382&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>wikipedia&gt;MSincccc: /* Support */ Singular here</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120382&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-01T16:01:48Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;autocomment&quot;&gt;Support: &lt;/span&gt; Singular here&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw-interface=&quot;&quot;&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-content&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; /&gt;
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				&lt;tr class=&quot;diff-title&quot; lang=&quot;en&quot;&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 16:01, 1 November 2026&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l107&quot;&gt;Line 107:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 107:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Existing FIDO U2F security keys are largely compatible with the WebAuthn standard, though WebAuthn added the ability to reference a unique per-account &amp;quot;user handle&amp;quot; identifier, which older authenticators are unable to store.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;W3C-WebAuthn-Level-1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Existing FIDO U2F security keys are largely compatible with the WebAuthn standard, though WebAuthn added the ability to reference a unique per-account &amp;quot;user handle&amp;quot; identifier, which older authenticators are unable to store.&amp;lt;ref name=&amp;quot;W3C-WebAuthn-Level-1&amp;quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;One of the first FIDO2-compatible [[authenticator]]s was the second-generation [[YubiKey|Security Key]] by Yubico, announced on 10 April 2018.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{cite press release |url=https://www.yubico.com/press-releases/280530/ |title=Yubico Launches New Developer Program and Security Key for FIDO2 and WebAuthn W3C Specifications |date=2018-04-10 |access-date=2018-05-11 |archive-date=7 May 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180507085439/https://www.yubico.com/press-releases/280530/ |url-status=live }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The first FIDO2-compatible &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;authenticators &lt;/del&gt;with a display was Trezor Model T by SatoshiLabs, announced on 6 November 2019.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{cite web |url=https://medium.com/trezor-security-blog/make-passwords-a-thing-of-the-past-a402745750dc |title=Make Passwords a Thing of the Past, FIDO2 Is Now Available on Trezor Model T |date=2019-11-06 |access-date=2019-11-06}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Trezor Model T was also the first authenticator that allowed users to select which FIDO2 resident credential should be used directly on a device.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;One of the first FIDO2-compatible [[authenticator]]s was the second-generation [[YubiKey|Security Key]] by Yubico, announced on 10 April 2018.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{cite press release |url=https://www.yubico.com/press-releases/280530/ |title=Yubico Launches New Developer Program and Security Key for FIDO2 and WebAuthn W3C Specifications |date=2018-04-10 |access-date=2018-05-11 |archive-date=7 May 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180507085439/https://www.yubico.com/press-releases/280530/ |url-status=live }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The first FIDO2-compatible &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;authenticator &lt;/ins&gt;with a display was Trezor Model T by SatoshiLabs, announced on 6 November 2019.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{cite web |url=https://medium.com/trezor-security-blog/make-passwords-a-thing-of-the-past-a402745750dc |title=Make Passwords a Thing of the Past, FIDO2 Is Now Available on Trezor Model T |date=2019-11-06 |access-date=2019-11-06}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Trezor Model T was also the first authenticator that allowed users to select which FIDO2 resident credential should be used directly on a device.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The first Security Level 2 certified FIDO2 key, called &amp;quot;Goldengate&amp;quot; was announced one year later by eWBM on 8 April 2019.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{cite press release |url=https://www.ewbm.com/press/pr2/ |title=eWBM: eWBM&amp;#039;s Goldengate Fingerprint Reader is First to Get FIDO L2 Certification |date=2019-04-08 |access-date=2019-06-15 |archive-date=1 January 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200101151355/https://www.ewbm.com/press/pr2/ |url-status=dead }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{cite press release |url=https://mobileidworld.com/ewbm-goldengate-fingerprint-reader-fido-l2-certification-804084/ |title=Mobile ID World, Alex Perala: eWBM&amp;#039;s Goldengate Fingerprint Reader is First to Get FIDO L2 Certification |date=2019-04-09 |access-date=2019-06-15 |archive-date=12 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200812130916/https://mobileidworld.com/ewbm-goldengate-fingerprint-reader-fido-l2-certification-804084/ |url-status=live }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The first Security Level 2 certified FIDO2 key, called &amp;quot;Goldengate&amp;quot; was announced one year later by eWBM on 8 April 2019.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{cite press release |url=https://www.ewbm.com/press/pr2/ |title=eWBM: eWBM&amp;#039;s Goldengate Fingerprint Reader is First to Get FIDO L2 Certification |date=2019-04-08 |access-date=2019-06-15 |archive-date=1 January 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200101151355/https://www.ewbm.com/press/pr2/ |url-status=dead }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{cite press release |url=https://mobileidworld.com/ewbm-goldengate-fingerprint-reader-fido-l2-certification-804084/ |title=Mobile ID World, Alex Perala: eWBM&amp;#039;s Goldengate Fingerprint Reader is First to Get FIDO L2 Certification |date=2019-04-09 |access-date=2019-06-15 |archive-date=12 August 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200812130916/https://mobileidworld.com/ewbm-goldengate-fingerprint-reader-fido-l2-certification-804084/ |url-status=live }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>wikipedia&gt;MSincccc</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120381&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>wikipedia&gt;MSincccc: /* Background */ Fixed a preposition.</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120381&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-01T16:00:51Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;autocomment&quot;&gt;Background: &lt;/span&gt; Fixed a preposition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw-interface=&quot;&quot;&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-content&quot; /&gt;
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				&lt;tr class=&quot;diff-title&quot; lang=&quot;en&quot;&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 16:00, 1 November 2026&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l54&quot;&gt;Line 54:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 54:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The combination of username and password has been the standard mechanism for users to prove to a website that they are a specific person since the dawn of web-based services.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Bonneau|first1=Joseph|last2=Herley|first2=Cormac|last3=Oorschot|first3=Paul C. van|last4=Stajano|first4=Frank|chapter=The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes |date=2012|title=2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy|pages=553–567|doi=10.1109/SP.2012.44 |bibcode=2012sp...conf...46B |isbn=978-1-4673-1244-8 }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, password-based authentication has been known to be flawed for many years, even decades, with most issues relating to poor practices on either the user side or the server side. Users routinely reuse passwords across services (which exposes them to [[credential stuffing]]),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Wang|first1=Chun|last2=Jan|first2=Steve T.K.|last3=Hu|first3=Hang|last4=Bossart|first4=Douglas|last5=Wang|first5=Gang|title=Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy |chapter=The Next Domino to Fall: Empirical Analysis of User Passwords across Online Services |date=2018-03-13 |language=en|publisher=ACM|pages=196–203|doi=10.1145/3176258.3176332|isbn=978-1-4503-5632-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; choose weak passwords that can be brute-forced and predicted in a short amount of time&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Mazurek|first1=Michelle L.|last2=Komanduri|first2=Saranga|last3=Vidas|first3=Timothy|last4=Bauer|first4=Lujo|last5=Christin|first5=Nicolas|last6=Cranor|first6=Lorrie Faith|last7=Kelley|first7=Patrick Gage|last8=Shay|first8=Richard|last9=Ur|first9=Blase|title=Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer &amp;amp; communications security - CCS &amp;#039;13 |chapter=Measuring password guessability for an entire university |date=2013 |language=en|publisher=ACM Press|pages=173–186|doi=10.1145/2508859.2516726|isbn=978-1-4503-2477-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, and store them in insecure ways that allows for their disclosure (for example writing them down on a piece of paper or a document),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite conference|publisher=USENIX Association|isbn=978-1-939133-10-6|pages=13–30|last1=Habib|first1=Hana|last2=Naeini|first2=Pardis Emami|last3=Devlin|first3=Summer|last4=Oates|first4=Maggie|last5=Swoopes|first5=Chelse|last6=Bauer|first6=Lujo|last7=Christin|first7=Nicolas|last8=Cranor|first8=Lorrie Faith|title=User behaviors and attitudes under password expiration policies|location=Baltimore, MD|date=2018|conference=Fourteenth Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2018)|book-title=}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; with each of those contributing to the likelihood of credentials and account compromise. Likewise, servers often deal with passwords improperly, both while storing them in [[Database|databases]], and while processing them. Flaws include plain-text storage, lack of [[Salt (cryptography)|salted]] [[Hash (cryptography)|hashing]] (or more advanced schemes for at-rest credentials),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Password Storage - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series |url=https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html |access-date=2026-11-01 |website=cheatsheetseries.owasp.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; arbitrary restrictions on password length and [[charset]], mandatory ineffective password changes, and deliberate incompatibility with [[Password manager|password managers]] (for instance, by preventing passwords to be pasted).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite journal |last=Lee |first=Kevin |last2=Sjöberg |first2=Sten |last3=Narayanan |first3=Arvind |date=2022 |title=Password policies of most top websites fail to follow best practices |url=https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2022/presentation/lee |journal=SOUPS &amp;#039;22 |language=en |pages=561–580 |isbn=978-1-939133-30-4}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The combination of username and password has been the standard mechanism for users to prove to a website that they are a specific person since the dawn of web-based services.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Bonneau|first1=Joseph|last2=Herley|first2=Cormac|last3=Oorschot|first3=Paul C. van|last4=Stajano|first4=Frank|chapter=The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes |date=2012|title=2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy|pages=553–567|doi=10.1109/SP.2012.44 |bibcode=2012sp...conf...46B |isbn=978-1-4673-1244-8 }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, password-based authentication has been known to be flawed for many years, even decades, with most issues relating to poor practices on either the user side or the server side. Users routinely reuse passwords across services (which exposes them to [[credential stuffing]]),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Wang|first1=Chun|last2=Jan|first2=Steve T.K.|last3=Hu|first3=Hang|last4=Bossart|first4=Douglas|last5=Wang|first5=Gang|title=Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy |chapter=The Next Domino to Fall: Empirical Analysis of User Passwords across Online Services |date=2018-03-13 |language=en|publisher=ACM|pages=196–203|doi=10.1145/3176258.3176332|isbn=978-1-4503-5632-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; choose weak passwords that can be brute-forced and predicted in a short amount of time&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Mazurek|first1=Michelle L.|last2=Komanduri|first2=Saranga|last3=Vidas|first3=Timothy|last4=Bauer|first4=Lujo|last5=Christin|first5=Nicolas|last6=Cranor|first6=Lorrie Faith|last7=Kelley|first7=Patrick Gage|last8=Shay|first8=Richard|last9=Ur|first9=Blase|title=Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer &amp;amp; communications security - CCS &amp;#039;13 |chapter=Measuring password guessability for an entire university |date=2013 |language=en|publisher=ACM Press|pages=173–186|doi=10.1145/2508859.2516726|isbn=978-1-4503-2477-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, and store them in insecure ways that allows for their disclosure (for example writing them down on a piece of paper or a document),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite conference|publisher=USENIX Association|isbn=978-1-939133-10-6|pages=13–30|last1=Habib|first1=Hana|last2=Naeini|first2=Pardis Emami|last3=Devlin|first3=Summer|last4=Oates|first4=Maggie|last5=Swoopes|first5=Chelse|last6=Bauer|first6=Lujo|last7=Christin|first7=Nicolas|last8=Cranor|first8=Lorrie Faith|title=User behaviors and attitudes under password expiration policies|location=Baltimore, MD|date=2018|conference=Fourteenth Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2018)|book-title=}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; with each of those contributing to the likelihood of credentials and account compromise. Likewise, servers often deal with passwords improperly, both while storing them in [[Database|databases]], and while processing them. Flaws include plain-text storage, lack of [[Salt (cryptography)|salted]] [[Hash (cryptography)|hashing]] (or more advanced schemes for at-rest credentials),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Password Storage - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series |url=https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html |access-date=2026-11-01 |website=cheatsheetseries.owasp.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; arbitrary restrictions on password length and [[charset]], mandatory ineffective password changes, and deliberate incompatibility with [[Password manager|password managers]] (for instance, by preventing passwords to be pasted).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite journal |last=Lee |first=Kevin |last2=Sjöberg |first2=Sten |last3=Narayanan |first3=Arvind |date=2022 |title=Password policies of most top websites fail to follow best practices |url=https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2022/presentation/lee |journal=SOUPS &amp;#039;22 |language=en |pages=561–580 |isbn=978-1-939133-30-4}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;As a result, in 2012, [[Google]] alongside [[Yubico]] started working on a standard called [[Universal 2nd Factor|Universal 2 Factor]] (U2F)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Yubico Company Timeline|url=https://www.yubico.com/why-yubico/yubico-innovation-history/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that would allow websites to programmatically verify a second-factor about the user by verifying the presence of hardware-based tokens (like [[smart card]]s) on the user. This standard was considered an improvement over existing solutions like time-based [[one-time password]] ([[TOTP - Time-based One-time Password Algorithm|TOTP]]) or SMS-based authentication that still left the user vulnerable to sophisticated [[phishing]] campaigns. The standard was later adopted into a larger industry-wide collaboration called the [[FIDO Alliance|FIDO (Fast IDentity Online) Alliance]]. The first draft for this proposed standard was published in 2014.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2014-12-09|title=FIDO Alliance Publishes Final FIDO 1.0 Specifications, First Industry Standards for Universal Strong Authentication|url=https://www.yubico.com/press-releases/fido-alliance-publishes-final-fido-1-0-specifications-first-industry-standards-for-universal-strong-authentication/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2015, the FIDO Alliance started developing the [[FIDO2 Project|FIDO 2 Project]], releasing a proposed standard where they sought to improve upon the existing U2F standard by addressing many of its weaknesses.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2015-09-04|title=FIDO Complete Spec 2015-09-04|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20150904/FIDO-COMPLETE-v2.0-ps-20150904.pdf|access-date=5 June 2026|website=Fido Alliance}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For example, the U2F standard still required &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;to &lt;/del&gt;use of passwords alongside a second factor which still left websites vulnerable to password leaks and other similar attacks that were common against passwords.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot;&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Ghorbani Lyastani|first1=Sanam|last2=Schilling|first2=Michael|last3=Neumayr|first3=Michaela|last4=Backes|first4=Michael|last5=Bugiel|first5=Sven|title=2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) |chapter=Is FIDO2 the Kingslayer of User Authentication? A Comparative Usability Study of FIDO2 Passwordless Authentication |date=May 2020 |publisher=IEEE|pages=268–285|doi=10.1109/SP40000.2020.00047|bibcode=2020sp...conf...24G |isbn=978-1-7281-3497-0}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Additionally, the U2F specification only verified the second factor device and did not perform any user authentication.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot; /&amp;gt; This meant that if the second factor device had been stolen or lost anyone with access to the U2F device would be able to bypass the second factor of authentication for accounts linked to the device.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;As a result, in 2012, [[Google]] alongside [[Yubico]] started working on a standard called [[Universal 2nd Factor|Universal 2 Factor]] (U2F)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Yubico Company Timeline|url=https://www.yubico.com/why-yubico/yubico-innovation-history/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that would allow websites to programmatically verify a second-factor about the user by verifying the presence of hardware-based tokens (like [[smart card]]s) on the user. This standard was considered an improvement over existing solutions like time-based [[one-time password]] ([[TOTP - Time-based One-time Password Algorithm|TOTP]]) or SMS-based authentication that still left the user vulnerable to sophisticated [[phishing]] campaigns. The standard was later adopted into a larger industry-wide collaboration called the [[FIDO Alliance|FIDO (Fast IDentity Online) Alliance]]. The first draft for this proposed standard was published in 2014.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2014-12-09|title=FIDO Alliance Publishes Final FIDO 1.0 Specifications, First Industry Standards for Universal Strong Authentication|url=https://www.yubico.com/press-releases/fido-alliance-publishes-final-fido-1-0-specifications-first-industry-standards-for-universal-strong-authentication/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2015, the FIDO Alliance started developing the [[FIDO2 Project|FIDO 2 Project]], releasing a proposed standard where they sought to improve upon the existing U2F standard by addressing many of its weaknesses.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2015-09-04|title=FIDO Complete Spec 2015-09-04|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20150904/FIDO-COMPLETE-v2.0-ps-20150904.pdf|access-date=5 June 2026|website=Fido Alliance}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For example, the U2F standard still required &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;the &lt;/ins&gt;use of passwords alongside a second factor which still left websites vulnerable to password leaks and other similar attacks that were common against passwords.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot;&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Ghorbani Lyastani|first1=Sanam|last2=Schilling|first2=Michael|last3=Neumayr|first3=Michaela|last4=Backes|first4=Michael|last5=Bugiel|first5=Sven|title=2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) |chapter=Is FIDO2 the Kingslayer of User Authentication? A Comparative Usability Study of FIDO2 Passwordless Authentication |date=May 2020 |publisher=IEEE|pages=268–285|doi=10.1109/SP40000.2020.00047|bibcode=2020sp...conf...24G |isbn=978-1-7281-3497-0}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Additionally, the U2F specification only verified the second factor device and did not perform any user authentication.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot; /&amp;gt; This meant that if the second factor device had been stolen or lost anyone with access to the U2F device would be able to bypass the second factor of authentication for accounts linked to the device.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In November 2015, the FIDO Alliance submitted the first version of FIDO 2 to the World Wide Web Consortium as a proposed web standard.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2015-11-20|title=W3C Welcomes the FIDO 2.0 Member Submission|url=https://www.w3.org/blog/2015/w3c-fido/|access-date=2026-06-05|website=W3C|language=en}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2016, the W3C established a separate [[Web Authentication Working Group|W3C Web Authentication Working Group]] to help write a standard for the new FIDO 2 project&amp;#039;s authentication framework such that it could be integrated into browsers by default.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Web Authentication Working Group Charter|url=https://www.w3.org/2015/12/web-authentication-charter.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The standard was adopted by major browser vendors in late 2018 and early 2019, with Chrome supporting the standard in version 67, Firefox in version 60 and Safari in version 13.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2026-02-19|title=Web Authentication API - Web APIs {{!}} MDN|url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API|access-date=2026-06-04|website=MDN Web Docs|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2019, the FIDO 2 project alongside the W3C Web Authentication Working Group released the first version of the WebAuthn specification based on the FIDO 2 project as a  W3C recommendation. Subsequently, the standard has gone through two revisions, being called Level 1, Level 2 with a Level 3 revision still being considered a Candidate Recommendation {{As of|2026|June|lc=y}},&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials - Level 3|url=https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/Overview.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; meaning that it is considered mature and feature complete and is ready for implementation and testing by interested parties.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=W3C Process Document|url=https://www.w3.org/policies/process/20250818/Overview.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In November 2015, the FIDO Alliance submitted the first version of FIDO 2 to the World Wide Web Consortium as a proposed web standard.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2015-11-20|title=W3C Welcomes the FIDO 2.0 Member Submission|url=https://www.w3.org/blog/2015/w3c-fido/|access-date=2026-06-05|website=W3C|language=en}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2016, the W3C established a separate [[Web Authentication Working Group|W3C Web Authentication Working Group]] to help write a standard for the new FIDO 2 project&amp;#039;s authentication framework such that it could be integrated into browsers by default.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Web Authentication Working Group Charter|url=https://www.w3.org/2015/12/web-authentication-charter.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The standard was adopted by major browser vendors in late 2018 and early 2019, with Chrome supporting the standard in version 67, Firefox in version 60 and Safari in version 13.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2026-02-19|title=Web Authentication API - Web APIs {{!}} MDN|url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API|access-date=2026-06-04|website=MDN Web Docs|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2019, the FIDO 2 project alongside the W3C Web Authentication Working Group released the first version of the WebAuthn specification based on the FIDO 2 project as a  W3C recommendation. Subsequently, the standard has gone through two revisions, being called Level 1, Level 2 with a Level 3 revision still being considered a Candidate Recommendation {{As of|2026|June|lc=y}},&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials - Level 3|url=https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/Overview.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; meaning that it is considered mature and feature complete and is ready for implementation and testing by interested parties.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=W3C Process Document|url=https://www.w3.org/policies/process/20250818/Overview.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>wikipedia&gt;MSincccc</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120380&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>wikipedia&gt;MSincccc: /* Background */ A hyphen.</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120380&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-01T15:58:48Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;span class=&quot;autocomment&quot;&gt;Background: &lt;/span&gt; A hyphen.&lt;/p&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 15:58, 1 November 2026&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l54&quot;&gt;Line 54:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 54:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The combination of username and password has been the standard mechanism for users to prove to a website that they are a specific person since the dawn of web-based services.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Bonneau|first1=Joseph|last2=Herley|first2=Cormac|last3=Oorschot|first3=Paul C. van|last4=Stajano|first4=Frank|chapter=The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes |date=2012|title=2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy|pages=553–567|doi=10.1109/SP.2012.44 |bibcode=2012sp...conf...46B |isbn=978-1-4673-1244-8 }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, password-based authentication has been known to be flawed for many years, even decades, with most issues relating to poor practices on either the user side or the server side. Users routinely reuse passwords across services (which exposes them to [[credential stuffing]]),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Wang|first1=Chun|last2=Jan|first2=Steve T.K.|last3=Hu|first3=Hang|last4=Bossart|first4=Douglas|last5=Wang|first5=Gang|title=Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy |chapter=The Next Domino to Fall: Empirical Analysis of User Passwords across Online Services |date=2018-03-13 |language=en|publisher=ACM|pages=196–203|doi=10.1145/3176258.3176332|isbn=978-1-4503-5632-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; choose weak passwords that can be brute-forced and predicted in a short amount of time&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Mazurek|first1=Michelle L.|last2=Komanduri|first2=Saranga|last3=Vidas|first3=Timothy|last4=Bauer|first4=Lujo|last5=Christin|first5=Nicolas|last6=Cranor|first6=Lorrie Faith|last7=Kelley|first7=Patrick Gage|last8=Shay|first8=Richard|last9=Ur|first9=Blase|title=Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer &amp;amp; communications security - CCS &amp;#039;13 |chapter=Measuring password guessability for an entire university |date=2013 |language=en|publisher=ACM Press|pages=173–186|doi=10.1145/2508859.2516726|isbn=978-1-4503-2477-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, and store them in insecure ways that allows for their disclosure (for example writing them down on a piece of paper or a document),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite conference|publisher=USENIX Association|isbn=978-1-939133-10-6|pages=13–30|last1=Habib|first1=Hana|last2=Naeini|first2=Pardis Emami|last3=Devlin|first3=Summer|last4=Oates|first4=Maggie|last5=Swoopes|first5=Chelse|last6=Bauer|first6=Lujo|last7=Christin|first7=Nicolas|last8=Cranor|first8=Lorrie Faith|title=User behaviors and attitudes under password expiration policies|location=Baltimore, MD|date=2018|conference=Fourteenth Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2018)|book-title=}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; with each of those contributing to the likelihood of credentials and account compromise. Likewise, servers often deal with passwords improperly, both while storing them in [[Database|databases]], and while processing them. Flaws include plain-text storage, lack of [[Salt (cryptography)|salted]] [[Hash (cryptography)|hashing]] (or more advanced schemes for at-rest credentials),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Password Storage - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series |url=https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html |access-date=2026-11-01 |website=cheatsheetseries.owasp.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; arbitrary restrictions on password length and [[charset]], mandatory ineffective password changes, and deliberate incompatibility with [[Password manager|password managers]] (for instance, by preventing passwords to be pasted).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite journal |last=Lee |first=Kevin |last2=Sjöberg |first2=Sten |last3=Narayanan |first3=Arvind |date=2022 |title=Password policies of most top websites fail to follow best practices |url=https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2022/presentation/lee |journal=SOUPS &amp;#039;22 |language=en |pages=561–580 |isbn=978-1-939133-30-4}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The combination of username and password has been the standard mechanism for users to prove to a website that they are a specific person since the dawn of web-based services.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Bonneau|first1=Joseph|last2=Herley|first2=Cormac|last3=Oorschot|first3=Paul C. van|last4=Stajano|first4=Frank|chapter=The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes |date=2012|title=2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy|pages=553–567|doi=10.1109/SP.2012.44 |bibcode=2012sp...conf...46B |isbn=978-1-4673-1244-8 }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, password-based authentication has been known to be flawed for many years, even decades, with most issues relating to poor practices on either the user side or the server side. Users routinely reuse passwords across services (which exposes them to [[credential stuffing]]),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Wang|first1=Chun|last2=Jan|first2=Steve T.K.|last3=Hu|first3=Hang|last4=Bossart|first4=Douglas|last5=Wang|first5=Gang|title=Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy |chapter=The Next Domino to Fall: Empirical Analysis of User Passwords across Online Services |date=2018-03-13 |language=en|publisher=ACM|pages=196–203|doi=10.1145/3176258.3176332|isbn=978-1-4503-5632-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; choose weak passwords that can be brute-forced and predicted in a short amount of time&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Mazurek|first1=Michelle L.|last2=Komanduri|first2=Saranga|last3=Vidas|first3=Timothy|last4=Bauer|first4=Lujo|last5=Christin|first5=Nicolas|last6=Cranor|first6=Lorrie Faith|last7=Kelley|first7=Patrick Gage|last8=Shay|first8=Richard|last9=Ur|first9=Blase|title=Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer &amp;amp; communications security - CCS &amp;#039;13 |chapter=Measuring password guessability for an entire university |date=2013 |language=en|publisher=ACM Press|pages=173–186|doi=10.1145/2508859.2516726|isbn=978-1-4503-2477-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, and store them in insecure ways that allows for their disclosure (for example writing them down on a piece of paper or a document),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite conference|publisher=USENIX Association|isbn=978-1-939133-10-6|pages=13–30|last1=Habib|first1=Hana|last2=Naeini|first2=Pardis Emami|last3=Devlin|first3=Summer|last4=Oates|first4=Maggie|last5=Swoopes|first5=Chelse|last6=Bauer|first6=Lujo|last7=Christin|first7=Nicolas|last8=Cranor|first8=Lorrie Faith|title=User behaviors and attitudes under password expiration policies|location=Baltimore, MD|date=2018|conference=Fourteenth Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2018)|book-title=}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; with each of those contributing to the likelihood of credentials and account compromise. Likewise, servers often deal with passwords improperly, both while storing them in [[Database|databases]], and while processing them. Flaws include plain-text storage, lack of [[Salt (cryptography)|salted]] [[Hash (cryptography)|hashing]] (or more advanced schemes for at-rest credentials),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Password Storage - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series |url=https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html |access-date=2026-11-01 |website=cheatsheetseries.owasp.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; arbitrary restrictions on password length and [[charset]], mandatory ineffective password changes, and deliberate incompatibility with [[Password manager|password managers]] (for instance, by preventing passwords to be pasted).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite journal |last=Lee |first=Kevin |last2=Sjöberg |first2=Sten |last3=Narayanan |first3=Arvind |date=2022 |title=Password policies of most top websites fail to follow best practices |url=https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2022/presentation/lee |journal=SOUPS &amp;#039;22 |language=en |pages=561–580 |isbn=978-1-939133-30-4}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;As a result, in 2012, [[Google]] alongside [[Yubico]] started working on a standard called [[Universal 2nd Factor|Universal 2 Factor]] (U2F)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Yubico Company Timeline|url=https://www.yubico.com/why-yubico/yubico-innovation-history/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that would allow websites to programmatically verify a second-factor about the user by verifying the presence of hardware-based tokens (like [[smart card]]s) on the user. This standard was considered an improvement over existing solutions like time-based [[one-time password]] ([[TOTP - Time-based One-time Password Algorithm|TOTP]]) or SMS-based authentication that still left the user vulnerable to sophisticated [[phishing]] campaigns. The standard was later adopted into a larger industry wide collaboration called the [[FIDO Alliance|FIDO (Fast IDentity Online) Alliance]]. The first draft for this proposed standard was published in 2014.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2014-12-09|title=FIDO Alliance Publishes Final FIDO 1.0 Specifications, First Industry Standards for Universal Strong Authentication|url=https://www.yubico.com/press-releases/fido-alliance-publishes-final-fido-1-0-specifications-first-industry-standards-for-universal-strong-authentication/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2015, the FIDO Alliance started developing the [[FIDO2 Project|FIDO 2 Project]], releasing a proposed standard where they sought to improve upon the existing U2F standard by addressing many of its weaknesses.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2015-09-04|title=FIDO Complete Spec 2015-09-04|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20150904/FIDO-COMPLETE-v2.0-ps-20150904.pdf|access-date=5 June 2026|website=Fido Alliance}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For example, the U2F standard still required to use of passwords alongside a second factor which still left websites vulnerable to password leaks and other similar attacks that were common against passwords.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot;&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Ghorbani Lyastani|first1=Sanam|last2=Schilling|first2=Michael|last3=Neumayr|first3=Michaela|last4=Backes|first4=Michael|last5=Bugiel|first5=Sven|title=2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) |chapter=Is FIDO2 the Kingslayer of User Authentication? A Comparative Usability Study of FIDO2 Passwordless Authentication |date=May 2020 |publisher=IEEE|pages=268–285|doi=10.1109/SP40000.2020.00047|bibcode=2020sp...conf...24G |isbn=978-1-7281-3497-0}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Additionally, the U2F specification only verified the second factor device and did not perform any user authentication.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot; /&amp;gt; This meant that if the second factor device had been stolen or lost anyone with access to the U2F device would be able to bypass the second factor of authentication for accounts linked to the device.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;As a result, in 2012, [[Google]] alongside [[Yubico]] started working on a standard called [[Universal 2nd Factor|Universal 2 Factor]] (U2F)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Yubico Company Timeline|url=https://www.yubico.com/why-yubico/yubico-innovation-history/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that would allow websites to programmatically verify a second-factor about the user by verifying the presence of hardware-based tokens (like [[smart card]]s) on the user. This standard was considered an improvement over existing solutions like time-based [[one-time password]] ([[TOTP - Time-based One-time Password Algorithm|TOTP]]) or SMS-based authentication that still left the user vulnerable to sophisticated [[phishing]] campaigns. The standard was later adopted into a larger industry&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;-&lt;/ins&gt;wide collaboration called the [[FIDO Alliance|FIDO (Fast IDentity Online) Alliance]]. The first draft for this proposed standard was published in 2014.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2014-12-09|title=FIDO Alliance Publishes Final FIDO 1.0 Specifications, First Industry Standards for Universal Strong Authentication|url=https://www.yubico.com/press-releases/fido-alliance-publishes-final-fido-1-0-specifications-first-industry-standards-for-universal-strong-authentication/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2015, the FIDO Alliance started developing the [[FIDO2 Project|FIDO 2 Project]], releasing a proposed standard where they sought to improve upon the existing U2F standard by addressing many of its weaknesses.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2015-09-04|title=FIDO Complete Spec 2015-09-04|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20150904/FIDO-COMPLETE-v2.0-ps-20150904.pdf|access-date=5 June 2026|website=Fido Alliance}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For example, the U2F standard still required to use of passwords alongside a second factor which still left websites vulnerable to password leaks and other similar attacks that were common against passwords.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot;&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Ghorbani Lyastani|first1=Sanam|last2=Schilling|first2=Michael|last3=Neumayr|first3=Michaela|last4=Backes|first4=Michael|last5=Bugiel|first5=Sven|title=2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) |chapter=Is FIDO2 the Kingslayer of User Authentication? A Comparative Usability Study of FIDO2 Passwordless Authentication |date=May 2020 |publisher=IEEE|pages=268–285|doi=10.1109/SP40000.2020.00047|bibcode=2020sp...conf...24G |isbn=978-1-7281-3497-0}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Additionally, the U2F specification only verified the second factor device and did not perform any user authentication.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot; /&amp;gt; This meant that if the second factor device had been stolen or lost anyone with access to the U2F device would be able to bypass the second factor of authentication for accounts linked to the device.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In November 2015, the FIDO Alliance submitted the first version of FIDO 2 to the World Wide Web Consortium as a proposed web standard.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2015-11-20|title=W3C Welcomes the FIDO 2.0 Member Submission|url=https://www.w3.org/blog/2015/w3c-fido/|access-date=2026-06-05|website=W3C|language=en}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2016, the W3C established a separate [[Web Authentication Working Group|W3C Web Authentication Working Group]] to help write a standard for the new FIDO 2 project&amp;#039;s authentication framework such that it could be integrated into browsers by default.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Web Authentication Working Group Charter|url=https://www.w3.org/2015/12/web-authentication-charter.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The standard was adopted by major browser vendors in late 2018 and early 2019, with Chrome supporting the standard in version 67, Firefox in version 60 and Safari in version 13.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2026-02-19|title=Web Authentication API - Web APIs {{!}} MDN|url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API|access-date=2026-06-04|website=MDN Web Docs|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2019, the FIDO 2 project alongside the W3C Web Authentication Working Group released the first version of the WebAuthn specification based on the FIDO 2 project as a  W3C recommendation. Subsequently, the standard has gone through two revisions, being called Level 1, Level 2 with a Level 3 revision still being considered a Candidate Recommendation {{As of|2026|June|lc=y}},&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials - Level 3|url=https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/Overview.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; meaning that it is considered mature and feature complete and is ready for implementation and testing by interested parties.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=W3C Process Document|url=https://www.w3.org/policies/process/20250818/Overview.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In November 2015, the FIDO Alliance submitted the first version of FIDO 2 to the World Wide Web Consortium as a proposed web standard.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2015-11-20|title=W3C Welcomes the FIDO 2.0 Member Submission|url=https://www.w3.org/blog/2015/w3c-fido/|access-date=2026-06-05|website=W3C|language=en}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2016, the W3C established a separate [[Web Authentication Working Group|W3C Web Authentication Working Group]] to help write a standard for the new FIDO 2 project&amp;#039;s authentication framework such that it could be integrated into browsers by default.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Web Authentication Working Group Charter|url=https://www.w3.org/2015/12/web-authentication-charter.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The standard was adopted by major browser vendors in late 2018 and early 2019, with Chrome supporting the standard in version 67, Firefox in version 60 and Safari in version 13.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2026-02-19|title=Web Authentication API - Web APIs {{!}} MDN|url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API|access-date=2026-06-04|website=MDN Web Docs|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2019, the FIDO 2 project alongside the W3C Web Authentication Working Group released the first version of the WebAuthn specification based on the FIDO 2 project as a  W3C recommendation. Subsequently, the standard has gone through two revisions, being called Level 1, Level 2 with a Level 3 revision still being considered a Candidate Recommendation {{As of|2026|June|lc=y}},&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials - Level 3|url=https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/Overview.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; meaning that it is considered mature and feature complete and is ready for implementation and testing by interested parties.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=W3C Process Document|url=https://www.w3.org/policies/process/20250818/Overview.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>wikipedia&gt;MSincccc</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120379&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>wikipedia&gt;MSincccc: Two spellings.</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120379&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-01T15:58:08Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Two spellings.&lt;/p&gt;
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				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 15:58, 1 November 2026&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l54&quot;&gt;Line 54:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 54:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The combination of username and password has been the standard mechanism for users to prove to a website that they are a specific person since the dawn of web-based services.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Bonneau|first1=Joseph|last2=Herley|first2=Cormac|last3=Oorschot|first3=Paul C. van|last4=Stajano|first4=Frank|chapter=The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes |date=2012|title=2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy|pages=553–567|doi=10.1109/SP.2012.44 |bibcode=2012sp...conf...46B |isbn=978-1-4673-1244-8 }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, password-based authentication has been known to be flawed for many years, even decades, with most issues relating to poor practices on either the user side or the server side. Users routinely reuse passwords across services (which exposes them to [[credential stuffing]]),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Wang|first1=Chun|last2=Jan|first2=Steve T.K.|last3=Hu|first3=Hang|last4=Bossart|first4=Douglas|last5=Wang|first5=Gang|title=Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy |chapter=The Next Domino to Fall: Empirical Analysis of User Passwords across Online Services |date=2018-03-13 |language=en|publisher=ACM|pages=196–203|doi=10.1145/3176258.3176332|isbn=978-1-4503-5632-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; choose weak passwords that can be brute-forced and predicted in a short amount of time&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Mazurek|first1=Michelle L.|last2=Komanduri|first2=Saranga|last3=Vidas|first3=Timothy|last4=Bauer|first4=Lujo|last5=Christin|first5=Nicolas|last6=Cranor|first6=Lorrie Faith|last7=Kelley|first7=Patrick Gage|last8=Shay|first8=Richard|last9=Ur|first9=Blase|title=Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer &amp;amp; communications security - CCS &amp;#039;13 |chapter=Measuring password guessability for an entire university |date=2013 |language=en|publisher=ACM Press|pages=173–186|doi=10.1145/2508859.2516726|isbn=978-1-4503-2477-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, and store them in insecure ways that allows for their disclosure (for example writing them down on a piece of paper or a document),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite conference|publisher=USENIX Association|isbn=978-1-939133-10-6|pages=13–30|last1=Habib|first1=Hana|last2=Naeini|first2=Pardis Emami|last3=Devlin|first3=Summer|last4=Oates|first4=Maggie|last5=Swoopes|first5=Chelse|last6=Bauer|first6=Lujo|last7=Christin|first7=Nicolas|last8=Cranor|first8=Lorrie Faith|title=User behaviors and attitudes under password expiration policies|location=Baltimore, MD|date=2018|conference=Fourteenth Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2018)|book-title=}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; with each of those contributing to the likelihood of credentials and account compromise. Likewise, servers often deal with passwords improperly, both while storing them in [[Database|databases]], and while processing them. Flaws include plain-text storage, lack of [[Salt (cryptography)|salted]] [[Hash (cryptography)|hashing]] (or more advanced schemes for at-rest credentials),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Password Storage - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series |url=https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html |access-date=2026-11-01 |website=cheatsheetseries.owasp.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; arbitrary restrictions on password length and [[charset]], mandatory ineffective password changes, and deliberate incompatibility with [[Password manager|password managers]] (for instance, by preventing passwords to be pasted).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite journal |last=Lee |first=Kevin |last2=Sjöberg |first2=Sten |last3=Narayanan |first3=Arvind |date=2022 |title=Password policies of most top websites fail to follow best practices |url=https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2022/presentation/lee |journal=SOUPS &amp;#039;22 |language=en |pages=561–580 |isbn=978-1-939133-30-4}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;The combination of username and password has been the standard mechanism for users to prove to a website that they are a specific person since the dawn of web-based services.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Bonneau|first1=Joseph|last2=Herley|first2=Cormac|last3=Oorschot|first3=Paul C. van|last4=Stajano|first4=Frank|chapter=The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes |date=2012|title=2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy|pages=553–567|doi=10.1109/SP.2012.44 |bibcode=2012sp...conf...46B |isbn=978-1-4673-1244-8 }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; However, password-based authentication has been known to be flawed for many years, even decades, with most issues relating to poor practices on either the user side or the server side. Users routinely reuse passwords across services (which exposes them to [[credential stuffing]]),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Wang|first1=Chun|last2=Jan|first2=Steve T.K.|last3=Hu|first3=Hang|last4=Bossart|first4=Douglas|last5=Wang|first5=Gang|title=Proceedings of the Eighth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy |chapter=The Next Domino to Fall: Empirical Analysis of User Passwords across Online Services |date=2018-03-13 |language=en|publisher=ACM|pages=196–203|doi=10.1145/3176258.3176332|isbn=978-1-4503-5632-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; choose weak passwords that can be brute-forced and predicted in a short amount of time&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Mazurek|first1=Michelle L.|last2=Komanduri|first2=Saranga|last3=Vidas|first3=Timothy|last4=Bauer|first4=Lujo|last5=Christin|first5=Nicolas|last6=Cranor|first6=Lorrie Faith|last7=Kelley|first7=Patrick Gage|last8=Shay|first8=Richard|last9=Ur|first9=Blase|title=Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on Computer &amp;amp; communications security - CCS &amp;#039;13 |chapter=Measuring password guessability for an entire university |date=2013 |language=en|publisher=ACM Press|pages=173–186|doi=10.1145/2508859.2516726|isbn=978-1-4503-2477-9}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;, and store them in insecure ways that allows for their disclosure (for example writing them down on a piece of paper or a document),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite conference|publisher=USENIX Association|isbn=978-1-939133-10-6|pages=13–30|last1=Habib|first1=Hana|last2=Naeini|first2=Pardis Emami|last3=Devlin|first3=Summer|last4=Oates|first4=Maggie|last5=Swoopes|first5=Chelse|last6=Bauer|first6=Lujo|last7=Christin|first7=Nicolas|last8=Cranor|first8=Lorrie Faith|title=User behaviors and attitudes under password expiration policies|location=Baltimore, MD|date=2018|conference=Fourteenth Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2018)|book-title=}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; with each of those contributing to the likelihood of credentials and account compromise. Likewise, servers often deal with passwords improperly, both while storing them in [[Database|databases]], and while processing them. Flaws include plain-text storage, lack of [[Salt (cryptography)|salted]] [[Hash (cryptography)|hashing]] (or more advanced schemes for at-rest credentials),&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Password Storage - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series |url=https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Storage_Cheat_Sheet.html |access-date=2026-11-01 |website=cheatsheetseries.owasp.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; arbitrary restrictions on password length and [[charset]], mandatory ineffective password changes, and deliberate incompatibility with [[Password manager|password managers]] (for instance, by preventing passwords to be pasted).&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite journal |last=Lee |first=Kevin |last2=Sjöberg |first2=Sten |last3=Narayanan |first3=Arvind |date=2022 |title=Password policies of most top websites fail to follow best practices |url=https://www.usenix.org/conference/soups2022/presentation/lee |journal=SOUPS &amp;#039;22 |language=en |pages=561–580 |isbn=978-1-939133-30-4}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;As a result, in 2012, [[Google]] alongside [[Yubico]] started working on a standard called [[Universal 2nd Factor|Universal 2 Factor]] (U2F)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Yubico Company Timeline|url=https://www.yubico.com/why-yubico/yubico-innovation-history/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that would allow websites to &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;programatically &lt;/del&gt;verify a second-factor about the user by verifying the presence of hardware-based tokens (like [[smart card]]s) on the user. This standard was considered an improvement over existing solutions like time-based [[one-time password]] ([[TOTP - Time-based One-time Password Algorithm|TOTP]]) or SMS-based authentication that still left the user vulnerable to sophisticated [[phishing]] campaigns. The standard was later adopted into a larger industry wide collaboration called the [[FIDO Alliance|FIDO (Fast IDentity Online) Alliance]]. The first draft for this proposed standard was published in 2014.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2014-12-09|title=FIDO Alliance Publishes Final FIDO 1.0 Specifications, First Industry Standards for Universal Strong Authentication|url=https://www.yubico.com/press-releases/fido-alliance-publishes-final-fido-1-0-specifications-first-industry-standards-for-universal-strong-authentication/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2015, the FIDO Alliance started developing the [[FIDO2 Project|FIDO 2 Project]], releasing a proposed standard where they sought to improve upon the existing U2F standard by addressing many of its weaknesses.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2015-09-04|title=FIDO Complete Spec 2015-09-04|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20150904/FIDO-COMPLETE-v2.0-ps-20150904.pdf|access-date=5 June 2026|website=Fido Alliance}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For example, the U2F standard still required to use of passwords alongside a second factor which still left websites vulnerable to password leaks and other similar attacks that were common against passwords.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot;&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Ghorbani Lyastani|first1=Sanam|last2=Schilling|first2=Michael|last3=Neumayr|first3=Michaela|last4=Backes|first4=Michael|last5=Bugiel|first5=Sven|title=2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) |chapter=Is FIDO2 the Kingslayer of User Authentication? A Comparative Usability Study of FIDO2 Passwordless Authentication |date=May 2020 |publisher=IEEE|pages=268–285|doi=10.1109/SP40000.2020.00047|bibcode=2020sp...conf...24G |isbn=978-1-7281-3497-0}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Additionally, the U2F specification only verified the second factor device and did not perform any user authentication.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot; /&amp;gt; This meant that if the second factor device had been stolen or lost anyone with access to the U2F device would be able to bypass the second factor of authentication for accounts linked to the device.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;As a result, in 2012, [[Google]] alongside [[Yubico]] started working on a standard called [[Universal 2nd Factor|Universal 2 Factor]] (U2F)&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Yubico Company Timeline|url=https://www.yubico.com/why-yubico/yubico-innovation-history/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; that would allow websites to &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;programmatically &lt;/ins&gt;verify a second-factor about the user by verifying the presence of hardware-based tokens (like [[smart card]]s) on the user. This standard was considered an improvement over existing solutions like time-based [[one-time password]] ([[TOTP - Time-based One-time Password Algorithm|TOTP]]) or SMS-based authentication that still left the user vulnerable to sophisticated [[phishing]] campaigns. The standard was later adopted into a larger industry wide collaboration called the [[FIDO Alliance|FIDO (Fast IDentity Online) Alliance]]. The first draft for this proposed standard was published in 2014.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2014-12-09|title=FIDO Alliance Publishes Final FIDO 1.0 Specifications, First Industry Standards for Universal Strong Authentication|url=https://www.yubico.com/press-releases/fido-alliance-publishes-final-fido-1-0-specifications-first-industry-standards-for-universal-strong-authentication/|access-date=2026-06-04|website=Yubico|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2015, the FIDO Alliance started developing the [[FIDO2 Project|FIDO 2 Project]], releasing a proposed standard where they sought to improve upon the existing U2F standard by addressing many of its weaknesses.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2015-09-04|title=FIDO Complete Spec 2015-09-04|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20150904/FIDO-COMPLETE-v2.0-ps-20150904.pdf|access-date=5 June 2026|website=Fido Alliance}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; For example, the U2F standard still required to use of passwords alongside a second factor which still left websites vulnerable to password leaks and other similar attacks that were common against passwords.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot;&amp;gt;{{Cite book |last1=Ghorbani Lyastani|first1=Sanam|last2=Schilling|first2=Michael|last3=Neumayr|first3=Michaela|last4=Backes|first4=Michael|last5=Bugiel|first5=Sven|title=2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) |chapter=Is FIDO2 the Kingslayer of User Authentication? A Comparative Usability Study of FIDO2 Passwordless Authentication |date=May 2020 |publisher=IEEE|pages=268–285|doi=10.1109/SP40000.2020.00047|bibcode=2020sp...conf...24G |isbn=978-1-7281-3497-0}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; Additionally, the U2F specification only verified the second factor device and did not perform any user authentication.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot; /&amp;gt; This meant that if the second factor device had been stolen or lost anyone with access to the U2F device would be able to bypass the second factor of authentication for accounts linked to the device.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;:0&quot; /&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In November 2015, the FIDO Alliance submitted the first version of FIDO 2 to the World Wide Web Consortium as a proposed web standard.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2015-11-20|title=W3C Welcomes the FIDO 2.0 Member Submission|url=https://www.w3.org/blog/2015/w3c-fido/|access-date=2026-06-05|website=W3C|language=en}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2016, the W3C established a separate [[Web Authentication Working Group|W3C Web Authentication Working Group]] to help write a standard for the new FIDO 2 project&amp;#039;s authentication framework such that it could be integrated into browsers by default.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Web Authentication Working Group Charter|url=https://www.w3.org/2015/12/web-authentication-charter.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The standard was adopted by major browser vendors in late 2018 and early 2019, with Chrome supporting the standard in version 67, Firefox in version 60 and Safari in version 13.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2026-02-19|title=Web Authentication API - Web APIs {{!}} MDN|url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API|access-date=2026-06-04|website=MDN Web Docs|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2019, the FIDO 2 project alongside the W3C Web Authentication Working Group released the first version of the WebAuthn specification based on the FIDO 2 project as a  W3C recommendation. Subsequently, the standard has gone through two revisions, being called Level 1, Level 2 with a Level 3 revision still being considered a Candidate Recommendation {{As of|2026|June|lc=y}},&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials - Level 3|url=https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/Overview.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; meaning that it is considered mature and feature complete and is ready for implementation and testing by interested parties.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=W3C Process Document|url=https://www.w3.org/policies/process/20250818/Overview.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;In November 2015, the FIDO Alliance submitted the first version of FIDO 2 to the World Wide Web Consortium as a proposed web standard.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2015-11-20|title=W3C Welcomes the FIDO 2.0 Member Submission|url=https://www.w3.org/blog/2015/w3c-fido/|access-date=2026-06-05|website=W3C|language=en}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2016, the W3C established a separate [[Web Authentication Working Group|W3C Web Authentication Working Group]] to help write a standard for the new FIDO 2 project&amp;#039;s authentication framework such that it could be integrated into browsers by default.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Web Authentication Working Group Charter|url=https://www.w3.org/2015/12/web-authentication-charter.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The standard was adopted by major browser vendors in late 2018 and early 2019, with Chrome supporting the standard in version 67, Firefox in version 60 and Safari in version 13.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |date=2026-02-19|title=Web Authentication API - Web APIs {{!}} MDN|url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API|access-date=2026-06-04|website=MDN Web Docs|language=en-US}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; In 2019, the FIDO 2 project alongside the W3C Web Authentication Working Group released the first version of the WebAuthn specification based on the FIDO 2 project as a  W3C recommendation. Subsequently, the standard has gone through two revisions, being called Level 1, Level 2 with a Level 3 revision still being considered a Candidate Recommendation {{As of|2026|June|lc=y}},&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials - Level 3|url=https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/Overview.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; meaning that it is considered mature and feature complete and is ready for implementation and testing by interested parties.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite web |title=W3C Process Document|url=https://www.w3.org/policies/process/20250818/Overview.html|access-date=2026-06-04|website=www.w3.org}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l81&quot;&gt;Line 81:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 81:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Authenticator is a multi-factor [[Cryptography|cryptographic]] authenticator that uses [[Cryptography#Public-key cryptography|public-key cryptography]] to sign an authentication assertion targeted at the website. Assuming the authenticator uses either a [[Facial recognition system|facial recognition]], fingerprint or PIN for user verification, the authenticator itself is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you have&amp;#039;&amp;#039; while the facial recognition and fingerprint (biometric) are &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you are&amp;#039;&amp;#039; and the PIN is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you know&amp;#039;&amp;#039;.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Authenticator is a multi-factor [[Cryptography|cryptographic]] authenticator that uses [[Cryptography#Public-key cryptography|public-key cryptography]] to sign an authentication assertion targeted at the website. Assuming the authenticator uses either a [[Facial recognition system|facial recognition]], fingerprint or PIN for user verification, the authenticator itself is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you have&amp;#039;&amp;#039; while the facial recognition and fingerprint (biometric) are &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you are&amp;#039;&amp;#039; and the PIN is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you know&amp;#039;&amp;#039;.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;To initiate the authentication flow, the website indicates its intentions to the web browser via [[JavaScript]].&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Web_Authentication_API-1&quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web |url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |title=Web Authentication API |at=Section [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API#Authentication Authentication] |publisher=[[Mozilla]] |access-date=18 March 2019 |archive-date=28 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201128172824/https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |url-status=live }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The web browser communicates with the authenticator using a JavaScript [[API]] implemented in the browser.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Web_Authentication_API-1&quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;W3C-WebAuthn-Level-1&quot; /&amp;gt; A hardware authenticator in the user&#039;s &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;posession &lt;/del&gt; conforms to the FIDO [[Client to Authenticator Protocol]] (CTAP),&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;FIDO-CTAP&quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web |editor1-last=Brand |editor1-first=Christiaan |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Ehrensvärd |editor3-first=Jakob |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=Michael B. |editor5-last=Kumar |editor5-first=Akshay |editor6-last=Lindemann |editor6-first=Rolf |editor7-last=Powers |editor7-first=Adam |editor8-last=Verrept |editor8-first=Johan |title=Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) |url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |publisher=FIDO Alliance |access-date=7 March 2019 |date=30 January 2019 |archive-date=8 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190308081859/https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |url-status=dead }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and connects over [[USB]], [[Bluetooth Low Energy]], or [[near-field communications]] (NFC). WebAuthn however does not strictly require a hardware authenticator. A platform authenticator (i.e., an authenticator implemented directly on the web browser or operating system) can  be used.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite journal |last=Vasileios Grammatopoulos |first=Athanasios |last2=Politis |first2=Ilias |last3=Xenakis |first3=Christos |date=2021-08-17 |title=A web tool for analyzing FIDO2/WebAuthn Requests and Responses |url=https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3465481.3469209 |journal=Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security |language=en |publisher=ACM |pages=1–10 |doi=10.1145/3465481.3469209 |isbn=978-1-4503-9051-4}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; If the user has registered their keys on a different device the WebAuthn 3 specification allows for the web browser to access credentials stored on another device without having to copy over the keys to the current device.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;To initiate the authentication flow, the website indicates its intentions to the web browser via [[JavaScript]].&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Web_Authentication_API-1&quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web |url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |title=Web Authentication API |at=Section [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API#Authentication Authentication] |publisher=[[Mozilla]] |access-date=18 March 2019 |archive-date=28 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201128172824/https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |url-status=live }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The web browser communicates with the authenticator using a JavaScript [[API]] implemented in the browser.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Web_Authentication_API-1&quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;W3C-WebAuthn-Level-1&quot; /&amp;gt; A hardware authenticator in the user&#039;s &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;possession &lt;/ins&gt; conforms to the FIDO [[Client to Authenticator Protocol]] (CTAP),&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;FIDO-CTAP&quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web |editor1-last=Brand |editor1-first=Christiaan |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Ehrensvärd |editor3-first=Jakob |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=Michael B. |editor5-last=Kumar |editor5-first=Akshay |editor6-last=Lindemann |editor6-first=Rolf |editor7-last=Powers |editor7-first=Adam |editor8-last=Verrept |editor8-first=Johan |title=Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) |url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |publisher=FIDO Alliance |access-date=7 March 2019 |date=30 January 2019 |archive-date=8 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190308081859/https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |url-status=dead }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and connects over [[USB]], [[Bluetooth Low Energy]], or [[near-field communications]] (NFC). WebAuthn however does not strictly require a hardware authenticator. A platform authenticator (i.e., an authenticator implemented directly on the web browser or operating system) can  be used.&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite journal |last=Vasileios Grammatopoulos |first=Athanasios |last2=Politis |first2=Ilias |last3=Xenakis |first3=Christos |date=2021-08-17 |title=A web tool for analyzing FIDO2/WebAuthn Requests and Responses |url=https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3465481.3469209 |journal=Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security |language=en |publisher=ACM |pages=1–10 |doi=10.1145/3465481.3469209 |isbn=978-1-4503-9051-4}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; If the user has registered their keys on a different device the WebAuthn 3 specification allows for the web browser to access credentials stored on another device without having to copy over the keys to the current device.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;===Registration===&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;===Registration===&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>wikipedia&gt;MSincccc</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120378&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>wikipedia&gt;Sohom Datta at 06:53, 1 November 2026</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120378&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-01T06:53:54Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw-interface=&quot;&quot;&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; /&gt;
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				&lt;tr class=&quot;diff-title&quot; lang=&quot;en&quot;&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 06:53, 1 November 2026&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l81&quot;&gt;Line 81:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 81:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Authenticator is a multi-factor [[Cryptography|cryptographic]] authenticator that uses [[Cryptography#Public-key cryptography|public-key cryptography]] to sign an authentication assertion targeted at the website. Assuming the authenticator uses either a [[Facial recognition system|facial recognition]], fingerprint or PIN for user verification, the authenticator itself is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you have&amp;#039;&amp;#039; while the facial recognition and fingerprint (biometric) are &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you are&amp;#039;&amp;#039; and the PIN is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you know&amp;#039;&amp;#039;.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Authenticator is a multi-factor [[Cryptography|cryptographic]] authenticator that uses [[Cryptography#Public-key cryptography|public-key cryptography]] to sign an authentication assertion targeted at the website. Assuming the authenticator uses either a [[Facial recognition system|facial recognition]], fingerprint or PIN for user verification, the authenticator itself is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you have&amp;#039;&amp;#039; while the facial recognition and fingerprint (biometric) are &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you are&amp;#039;&amp;#039; and the PIN is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you know&amp;#039;&amp;#039;.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;To initiate the authentication flow, the website indicates its intentions to the web browser via [[JavaScript]].&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Web_Authentication_API-1&quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web |url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |title=Web Authentication API |at=Section [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API#Authentication Authentication] |publisher=[[Mozilla]] |access-date=18 March 2019 |archive-date=28 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201128172824/https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |url-status=live }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The web browser communicates with the authenticator using a JavaScript [[API]] implemented in the browser.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Web_Authentication_API-1&quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;W3C-WebAuthn-Level-1&quot; /&amp;gt; A hardware authenticator in the user&#039;s posession  conforms to the FIDO [[Client to Authenticator Protocol]] (CTAP),&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;FIDO-CTAP&quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web |editor1-last=Brand |editor1-first=Christiaan |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Ehrensvärd |editor3-first=Jakob |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=Michael B. |editor5-last=Kumar |editor5-first=Akshay |editor6-last=Lindemann |editor6-first=Rolf |editor7-last=Powers |editor7-first=Adam |editor8-last=Verrept |editor8-first=Johan |title=Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) |url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |publisher=FIDO Alliance |access-date=7 March 2019 |date=30 January 2019 |archive-date=8 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190308081859/https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |url-status=dead }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and connects over [[USB]], [[Bluetooth Low Energy]], or [[near-field communications]] (NFC). WebAuthn however does not strictly require a hardware authenticator. &lt;del style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;Alternatively, a software authenticator (e.g., implemented on a smartphone) or a &lt;/del&gt;platform authenticator (i.e., an authenticator implemented directly on the web browser or operating system) can  be used. If the user has registered their keys on a different device the WebAuthn 3 specification allows for the web browser to access credentials stored on another device without having to copy over the keys to the current device.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;To initiate the authentication flow, the website indicates its intentions to the web browser via [[JavaScript]].&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Web_Authentication_API-1&quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web |url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |title=Web Authentication API |at=Section [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API#Authentication Authentication] |publisher=[[Mozilla]] |access-date=18 March 2019 |archive-date=28 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201128172824/https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |url-status=live }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The web browser communicates with the authenticator using a JavaScript [[API]] implemented in the browser.&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Web_Authentication_API-1&quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;W3C-WebAuthn-Level-1&quot; /&amp;gt; A hardware authenticator in the user&#039;s posession  conforms to the FIDO [[Client to Authenticator Protocol]] (CTAP),&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;FIDO-CTAP&quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web |editor1-last=Brand |editor1-first=Christiaan |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Ehrensvärd |editor3-first=Jakob |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=Michael B. |editor5-last=Kumar |editor5-first=Akshay |editor6-last=Lindemann |editor6-first=Rolf |editor7-last=Powers |editor7-first=Adam |editor8-last=Verrept |editor8-first=Johan |title=Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) |url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |publisher=FIDO Alliance |access-date=7 March 2019 |date=30 January 2019 |archive-date=8 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190308081859/https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |url-status=dead }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and connects over [[USB]], [[Bluetooth Low Energy]], or [[near-field communications]] (NFC). WebAuthn however does not strictly require a hardware authenticator. &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;A &lt;/ins&gt;platform authenticator (i.e., an authenticator implemented directly on the web browser or operating system) can  be used.&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{Cite journal |last=Vasileios Grammatopoulos |first=Athanasios |last2=Politis |first2=Ilias |last3=Xenakis |first3=Christos |date=2021-08-17 |title=A web tool for analyzing FIDO2/WebAuthn Requests and Responses |url=https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3465481.3469209 |journal=Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security |language=en |publisher=ACM |pages=1–10 |doi=10.1145/3465481.3469209 |isbn=978-1-4503-9051-4}}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; &lt;/ins&gt;If the user has registered their keys on a different device the WebAuthn 3 specification allows for the web browser to access credentials stored on another device without having to copy over the keys to the current device.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;===Registration===&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;===Registration===&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>wikipedia&gt;Sohom Datta</name></author>
	</entry>
	<entry>
		<id>https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120377&amp;oldid=prev</id>
		<title>wikipedia&gt;Sohom Datta at 06:47, 1 November 2026</title>
		<link rel="alternate" type="text/html" href="https://ideawaza.com/index.php?title=WebAuthn&amp;diff=120377&amp;oldid=prev"/>
		<updated>2026-11-01T06:47:02Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;table style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122;&quot; data-mw-interface=&quot;&quot;&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-content&quot; /&gt;
				&lt;col class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; /&gt;
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				&lt;tr class=&quot;diff-title&quot; lang=&quot;en&quot;&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;← Older revision&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; style=&quot;background-color: #fff; color: #202122; text-align: center;&quot;&gt;Revision as of 06:47, 1 November 2026&lt;/td&gt;
				&lt;/tr&gt;&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot; id=&quot;mw-diff-left-l81&quot;&gt;Line 81:&lt;/td&gt;
&lt;td colspan=&quot;2&quot; class=&quot;diff-lineno&quot;&gt;Line 81:&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Authenticator is a multi-factor [[Cryptography|cryptographic]] authenticator that uses [[Cryptography#Public-key cryptography|public-key cryptography]] to sign an authentication assertion targeted at the website. Assuming the authenticator uses either a [[Facial recognition system|facial recognition]], fingerprint or PIN for user verification, the authenticator itself is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you have&amp;#039;&amp;#039; while the facial recognition and fingerprint (biometric) are &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you are&amp;#039;&amp;#039; and the PIN is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you know&amp;#039;&amp;#039;.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;Authenticator is a multi-factor [[Cryptography|cryptographic]] authenticator that uses [[Cryptography#Public-key cryptography|public-key cryptography]] to sign an authentication assertion targeted at the website. Assuming the authenticator uses either a [[Facial recognition system|facial recognition]], fingerprint or PIN for user verification, the authenticator itself is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you have&amp;#039;&amp;#039; while the facial recognition and fingerprint (biometric) are &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you are&amp;#039;&amp;#039; and the PIN is &amp;#039;&amp;#039;something you know&amp;#039;&amp;#039;.&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;−&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #ffe49c; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;To initiate the authentication flow, the website indicates its intentions to the web browser via [[JavaScript]].&amp;lt;ref&amp;gt;{{cite web |url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |title=Web Authentication API |at=Section [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API#Authentication Authentication] |publisher=[[Mozilla]] |access-date=18 March 2019 |archive-date=28 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201128172824/https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |url-status=live }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The web browser communicates with the authenticator using a JavaScript [[API]] implemented in the browser. A authenticator in the user&#039;s posession  conforms to the FIDO [[Client to Authenticator Protocol]] (CTAP),&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;FIDO-CTAP&quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web |editor1-last=Brand |editor1-first=Christiaan |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Ehrensvärd |editor3-first=Jakob |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=Michael B. |editor5-last=Kumar |editor5-first=Akshay |editor6-last=Lindemann |editor6-first=Rolf |editor7-last=Powers |editor7-first=Adam |editor8-last=Verrept |editor8-first=Johan |title=Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) |url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |publisher=FIDO Alliance |access-date=7 March 2019 |date=30 January 2019 |archive-date=8 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190308081859/https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |url-status=dead }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and connects over [[USB]], [[Bluetooth Low Energy]], or [[near-field communications]] (NFC). WebAuthn does not strictly require a hardware authenticator. Alternatively, a software authenticator (e.g., implemented on a smartphone) or a platform authenticator (i.e., an authenticator implemented directly on the web browser or operating system) can  be used. If the user has registered their keys on a different device the WebAuthn 3 specification allows for the web browser to access credentials stored on another device without having to copy over the keys to the current device.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot; data-marker=&quot;+&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #a3d3ff; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;To initiate the authentication flow, the website indicates its intentions to the web browser via [[JavaScript]].&amp;lt;ref &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;name=&quot;Web_Authentication_API-1&quot;&lt;/ins&gt;&amp;gt;{{cite web |url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |title=Web Authentication API |at=Section [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API#Authentication Authentication] |publisher=[[Mozilla]] |access-date=18 March 2019 |archive-date=28 November 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201128172824/https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |url-status=live }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; The web browser communicates with the authenticator using a JavaScript [[API]] implemented in the browser.&lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;Web_Authentication_API-1&quot; /&amp;gt;&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;W3C-WebAuthn-Level-1&quot; /&amp;gt; &lt;/ins&gt;A &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;hardware &lt;/ins&gt;authenticator in the user&#039;s posession  conforms to the FIDO [[Client to Authenticator Protocol]] (CTAP),&amp;lt;ref name=&quot;FIDO-CTAP&quot;&amp;gt;{{cite web |editor1-last=Brand |editor1-first=Christiaan |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Ehrensvärd |editor3-first=Jakob |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=Michael B. |editor5-last=Kumar |editor5-first=Akshay |editor6-last=Lindemann |editor6-first=Rolf |editor7-last=Powers |editor7-first=Adam |editor8-last=Verrept |editor8-first=Johan |title=Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) |url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |publisher=FIDO Alliance |access-date=7 March 2019 |date=30 January 2019 |archive-date=8 March 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190308081859/https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |url-status=dead }}&amp;lt;/ref&amp;gt; and connects over [[USB]], [[Bluetooth Low Energy]], or [[near-field communications]] (NFC). WebAuthn &lt;ins style=&quot;font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none;&quot;&gt;however &lt;/ins&gt;does not strictly require a hardware authenticator. Alternatively, a software authenticator (e.g., implemented on a smartphone) or a platform authenticator (i.e., an authenticator implemented directly on the web browser or operating system) can  be used. If the user has registered their keys on a different device the WebAuthn 3 specification allows for the web browser to access credentials stored on another device without having to copy over the keys to the current device.  &lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;br&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;tr&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;===Registration===&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td class=&quot;diff-marker&quot;&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;td style=&quot;background-color: #f8f9fa; color: #202122; font-size: 88%; border-style: solid; border-width: 1px 1px 1px 4px; border-radius: 0.33em; border-color: #eaecf0; vertical-align: top; white-space: pre-wrap;&quot;&gt;&lt;div&gt;===Registration===&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/td&gt;&lt;/tr&gt;
&lt;/table&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>wikipedia&gt;Sohom Datta</name></author>
	</entry>
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