Wolf pack: Difference between revisions
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The term '''wolf pack''' refers to the mass-attack tactics against [[convoy]]s used by [[Germany|German]] [[U-boat]]s of the [[Kriegsmarine]] during the [[Second Battle of the Atlantic|Battle of the Atlantic]] and [[submarine]]s of the [[United States Navy]] against [[Japan]]ese shipping in the [[Pacific Ocean]] in [[World War II]]. | The term '''wolf pack''' refers to the mass-attack tactics against [[convoy]]s used by [[Germany|German]] [[U-boat]]s of the [[Kriegsmarine]] during the [[Second Battle of the Atlantic|Battle of the Atlantic]] and [[submarine]]s of the [[United States Navy]] against [[Japan]]ese shipping in the [[Pacific Ocean]] in [[World War II]]. | ||
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U-boat movements were controlled by the ''[[Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote]]'' (BdU; English translation: "Commander of Submarines") much more closely than American submarines, which were given tremendous independence once on patrol. Accordingly, U-boats usually patrolled separately, often strung out in co-ordinated lines across likely convoy routes (usually merchants and small vulnerable destroyers), only being ordered to congregate after one located a convoy and alerted the BdU, so a ''Rudel'' consisted of as many [[U-boat]]s as could reach the scene of the attack. With the exception of the orders given by the BdU, U-Boat commanders could attack as they saw fit. Often the U-Boat commanders were given a probable number of U-Boats that would show up, and then when they were in contact with the convoy, make call signs to see how many had arrived. If their number were sufficiently high compared to the expected threat of the escorts, they would attack. | U-boat movements were controlled by the ''[[Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote]]'' (BdU; English translation: "Commander of Submarines") much more closely than American submarines, which were given tremendous independence once on patrol. Accordingly, U-boats usually patrolled separately, often strung out in co-ordinated lines across likely convoy routes (usually merchants and small vulnerable destroyers), only being ordered to congregate after one located a convoy and alerted the BdU, so a ''Rudel'' consisted of as many [[U-boat]]s as could reach the scene of the attack. With the exception of the orders given by the BdU, U-Boat commanders could attack as they saw fit. Often the U-Boat commanders were given a probable number of U-Boats that would show up, and then when they were in contact with the convoy, make call signs to see how many had arrived. If their number were sufficiently high compared to the expected threat of the escorts, they would attack. | ||
American wolf packs, officially called ''coordinated attack groups'', usually comprised three boats that patrolled in close company and organized before they left port under the command of the senior captain of the three. [[Charles Momsen|"Swede" Momsen]] devised the tactics and led the first American wolf pack from Midway on 1 October, 1943 - | American wolf packs, officially called ''coordinated attack groups'', usually comprised three boats that patrolled in close company and organized before they left port under the command of the senior captain of the three. [[Charles Momsen|"Swede" Momsen]] devised the tactics and led the first American wolf pack from Midway on 1 October, 1943 - | ||
Although the wolf packs proved a serious threat to Allied shipping, the Allies developed countermeasures to turn the U-boat organization against itself. Most notably was the fact that wolf packs required extensive [[radio]] communication to coordinate the attacks. This left the U-boats vulnerable to a device called the [[High Frequency Direction Finder]] (HF/DF or "Huff-Duff") which allowed Allied naval forces to determine the location of the enemy boats transmitting and attack them. Also, effective air cover, both long-range planes with radar, and [[escort carrier]]s and [[blimp]]s, allowed U-boats to be spotted as they shadowed a convoy (waiting for the cover of night to attack). The destroyers of the Atlantic also used depth charges and other small mines which could be dropped off the ships' side. | Although the wolf packs proved a serious threat to Allied shipping, the Allies developed countermeasures to turn the U-boat organization against itself. Most notably was the fact that wolf packs required extensive [[radio]] communication to coordinate the attacks. This left the U-boats vulnerable to a device called the [[High Frequency Direction Finder]] (HF/DF or "Huff-Duff") which allowed Allied naval forces to determine the location of the enemy boats transmitting and attack them. Also, effective air cover, both long-range planes with radar, and [[escort carrier]]s and [[blimp]]s, allowed U-boats to be spotted as they shadowed a convoy (waiting for the cover of night to attack). The destroyers of the Atlantic also used depth charges and other small mines which could be dropped off the ships' side. | ||
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* E. B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, eds; ''Sea Power: A Naval History'' (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960) | * E. B. Potter and Chester W. Nimitz, eds; ''Sea Power: A Naval History'' (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1960) | ||
[[Category:Naval warfare tactics]] | [[Category:Naval warfare tactics]] | ||
[[Category:Wolfpacks of World War II|*]] | [[Category:Wolfpacks of World War II|*]] | ||