Archive:Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System: Difference between revisions

No edit summary
Line 3: Line 3:
== Findings ==
== Findings ==


In 2001, the commitee concluded that the [[ECHELON]] surveillance system "almost certainly" existed, but it also acknowledged that beyond stepping up diplomatic pressure on the [[Five Eyes]] to abide by privacy laws, there is not much that the [[European Union]] could do to evade their surveillance.<ref>{{cite web|last=Leyden|first=John|title=Europe should tackle home-grown Echelons, says MEP|url=http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2001/07/06/europe_should_tackle_homegrown_echelons/|publisher=[[The Register]]|accessdate=27 January 2014|date=6 July 2001}}</ref>  
In 2001, the commitee concluded that the [[ECHELON]] surveillance system "almost certainly" existed, but it also acknowledged that beyond stepping up diplomatic pressure on the [[Five Eyes]] to abide by privacy laws, there is not much that the [[European Union]] could do to evade their surveillance.<ref>{{cite web|last=Leyden|first=John|title=Europe should tackle home-grown Echelons, says MEP|url=http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2001/07/06/europe_should_tackle_homegrown_echelons/|publisher=[[The Register]]|accessdate=27 January 2014|date=6 July 2001}}</ref>
 
The following is an excerpt taken from the final report of the committee:
 
{{Collapse top|title=Excerpt of the final report of the commitee dated 11 July, 2001<ref name="EUechelon"/>
}}
'''Title: Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications'''<ref name="EUechelon">{{cite web|title=Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI))|url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A5-2001-0264&format=XML&language=EN|publisher=[[European Parliament]]|date=11 July 2001|accessdate=10 September 2013}}</ref>
 
'''Date: 11 July 2001'''<ref name="EUechelon"/>
 
''The system known as ‘ECHELON’ is an interception system which differs from other intelligence systems in that it possesses two features which make it quite unusual:''
 
''The first such feature attributed to it is the capacity to carry out quasi-total surveillance. Satellite receiver stations and spy satellites in particular are alleged to give it the ability to intercept any [[telephone]], [[fax]], [[Internet]] or [[e-mail]] message sent by any individual and thus to inspect its contents.''
 
''The second unusual feature of ECHELON is said to be that the system operates worldwide on the basis of cooperation proportionate to their capabilities among several states (the [[UK]], the [[USA]], [[Canada]], [[Australia]] and [[New Zealand]]), giving it an added value in comparison to national systems: the states participating in ECHELON ([[UKUSA Agreement|UKUSA states]]) can place their interception systems at each other’s disposal, share the cost and make joint use of the resulting information. This type of international cooperation is essential in particular for the worldwide interception of satellite communications, since only in this way is it possible to ensure in international communications that both sides of a dialogue can be intercepted. It is clear that, in view of its size, a satellite receiver station cannot be established on the territory of a state without that state’s knowledge. Mutual agreement and proportionate cooperation among several states in different parts of the world is essential.''
 
''Possible threats to privacy and to businesses posed by a system of the ECHELON type arise not only from the fact that is a particularly powerful monitoring system, but also that it operates in a largely legislation-free area. Systems for the interception of international communications are not usually targeted at residents of the home country. The person whose messages were intercepted would have no domestic legal protection, not being resident in the country concerned. Such a person would be completely at the mercy of the system. Parliamentary supervision would also be inadequate in this area, since the voters, who assume that interception ‘only’ affects people abroad, would not be particularly interested in it, and elected representatives chiefly follow the interests of their voters.''
 
''That being so, it is hardly surprising that the hearings held in the [[US Congress]] concerning the activities of the [[NSA]] were confined to the question of whether US citizens were affected by it, with no real concern expressed regarding the existence of such a system in itself. It thus seems all the more important to investigate this issue at European level.''<ref name="EUechelon"/>
{{Collapse bottom}}
{{clear}}


== Controversy ==
== Controversy ==