Archive:Temporary Committee on the ECHELON Interception System: Difference between revisions
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
The '''Temporary Committee on ECHELON''' was a [[Committees of the European Parliament|Committee of the European Parliament]] that was set up to investigate the global surveillance network [[ECHELON]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Ruuda|first=Marit|title=Echelon committee suspicions grow|url=http://euobserver.com/news/2337|publisher=[[EUobserver]]|accessdate=27 January 2014|date=16 May 2001}}</ref> | The '''Temporary Committee on ECHELON''' was a [[Committees of the European Parliament|Committee of the European Parliament]] that was set up to investigate the global surveillance network [[ECHELON]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Ruuda|first=Marit|title=Echelon committee suspicions grow|url=http://euobserver.com/news/2337|publisher=[[EUobserver]]|accessdate=27 January 2014|date=16 May 2001}}</ref> | ||
== | == Final report == | ||
In 2001, the commitee concluded that the [[ECHELON]] surveillance system "almost certainly" existed, but it also acknowledged that beyond stepping up diplomatic pressure on the [[Five Eyes]] to abide by privacy laws, there is not much that the [[European Union]] could do to evade their surveillance.<ref>{{cite web|last=Leyden|first=John|title=Europe should tackle home-grown Echelons, says MEP|url=http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2001/07/06/europe_should_tackle_homegrown_echelons/|publisher=[[The Register]]|accessdate=27 January 2014|date=6 July 2001}}</ref> | In 2001, the commitee concluded that the [[ECHELON]] surveillance system "almost certainly" existed, but it also acknowledged that beyond stepping up diplomatic pressure on the [[Five Eyes]] to abide by privacy laws, there is not much that the [[European Union]] could do to evade their surveillance.<ref>{{cite web|last=Leyden|first=John|title=Europe should tackle home-grown Echelons, says MEP|url=http://www.theregister.co.uk/Print/2001/07/06/europe_should_tackle_homegrown_echelons/|publisher=[[The Register]]|accessdate=27 January 2014|date=6 July 2001}}</ref> | ||
In its final report, the committee noted the following two features of the [[ECHELON]] surveillance network that is described as "unusual": | |||
{{ | {{quote|The first such feature attributed to it is the capacity to carry out quasi-total surveillance. Satellite receiver stations and spy satellites in particular are alleged to give it the ability to intercept any [[telephone]], [[fax]], [[Internet]] or [[e-mail]] message sent by any individual and thus to inspect its contents. | ||
The second unusual feature of ECHELON is said to be that the system operates worldwide on the basis of cooperation proportionate to their capabilities among several states (the [[UK]], the [[USA]], [[Canada]], [[Australia]] and [[New Zealand]]), giving it an added value in comparison to national systems: the states participating in ECHELON ([[UKUSA Agreement|UKUSA states]]) can place their interception systems at each other’s disposal, share the cost and make joint use of the resulting information.<ref name="EUechelon">{{cite web|title=Report on the existence of a global system for the interception of private and commercial communications (ECHELON interception system) (2001/2098(INI))|url=http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A5-2001-0264&format=XML&language=EN|publisher=[[European Parliament]]|date=11 July 2001|accessdate=10 September 2013}}</ref>}} | |||
== Controversy == | == Controversy == | ||