Sender ID: Difference between revisions

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Changed all occurances of "SenderID" to "Sender ID" since Microsoft, RFC-4406, and so on all use "Sender ID". Also added link to RFC-4406 in the External links section.
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== Principles of operation ==
== Principles of operation ==


SenderID is heavily based on [[Sender Policy Framework|SPF]], with only a few additions.  This article will mostly discuss just these differences.
Sender ID is heavily based on [[Sender Policy Framework|SPF]], with only a few additions.  This article will mostly discuss just these differences.


Syntactically, SPF and SenderID are almost identical:
Syntactically, SPF and Sender ID are almost identical:
Replacing the string <tt>v=spf1</tt> in a valid SPF
Replacing the string <tt>v=spf1</tt> in a valid SPF
policy by one of...
policy by one of...
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# <tt>spf2.0/pra,mfrom</tt>
# <tt>spf2.0/pra,mfrom</tt>
# <tt>spf2.0/pra</tt>
# <tt>spf2.0/pra</tt>
...yields a syntactically valid SenderID policy, and
...yields a syntactically valid Sender ID policy, and
vice versa. The evaluation of SPF and SenderID policies
vice versa. The evaluation of SPF and Sender ID policies
follows the same general rules. The core SenderID
follows the same general rules. The core Sender ID
specification has a normative reference to the SPF
specification has a normative reference to the SPF
specification and thereby inherits exactly the same error
specification and thereby inherits exactly the same error
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details as SPF.
details as SPF.


Semantically, there are only two differences: SenderID offers
Semantically, there are only two differences: Sender ID offers
the feature of ''positional'' modifiers not supported in SPF.
the feature of ''positional'' modifiers not supported in SPF.
In practice, so far no ''positional'' modifier has been specified—
In practice, so far no ''positional'' modifier has been specified—
let alone supported—in any SenderID implementation.
let alone supported—in any Sender ID implementation.


Except for this detail, <tt>spf2.0/mfrom</tt> is semantically
Except for this detail, <tt>spf2.0/mfrom</tt> is semantically
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not specified how SPF's <tt><nowiki>%{h}</nowiki></tt> macro
not specified how SPF's <tt><nowiki>%{h}</nowiki></tt> macro
for the HELO identity should be handled in ''pra'' checks,  
for the HELO identity should be handled in ''pra'' checks,  
SenderID implementations could handle it as syntax error.
Sender ID implementations could handle it as syntax error.


The Purported Responsible Address or ''pra'' is determined
The Purported Responsible Address or ''pra'' is determined
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This ''pra'' scheme has the theoretical advantage of dealing with addresses
This ''pra'' scheme has the theoretical advantage of dealing with addresses
in header fields that are often displayed by MUAs (Mail User Agents),
in header fields that are often displayed by MUAs (Mail User Agents),
unlike SPF's Return-Path header field or ''mfrom'' in SenderID terminology.
unlike SPF's Return-Path header field or ''mfrom'' in Sender ID terminology.
    
    
In practice, the ''pra'' scheme usually only offers protection when the email is legitimate, while offering no real protection in the case of spam or phishing.  The ''pra'' for most legitimate email will be either the familiar From: header field, or, in the case of mailing lists, the Sender: header field.  In the case of phishing or spam, however, the ''pra'' may be based on Resent-* header fields that are often not displayed to the user.
In practice, the ''pra'' scheme usually only offers protection when the email is legitimate, while offering no real protection in the case of spam or phishing.  The ''pra'' for most legitimate email will be either the familiar From: header field, or, in the case of mailing lists, the Sender: header field.  In the case of phishing or spam, however, the ''pra'' may be based on Resent-* header fields that are often not displayed to the user.
To be an effective anti-phishing tool, the MUA will need to be modified to display either the ''pra'' for SenderID, or the Return-Path: header field for SPF.   
To be an effective anti-phishing tool, the MUA will need to be modified to display either the ''pra'' for Sender ID, or the Return-Path: header field for SPF.   


The ''pra'' tries to counter the problem of ''phishing'',
The ''pra'' tries to counter the problem of ''phishing'',
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added their host name to the reverse path in the MAIL FROM.
added their host name to the reverse path in the MAIL FROM.


The most problematic point in the core SenderID specification
The most problematic point in the core Sender ID specification
is its recommendation to interpret <tt>v=spf1</tt> policies like
is its recommendation to interpret <tt>v=spf1</tt> policies like
<tt>spf2.0/mfrom,pra</tt> instead of <tt>spf2.0/mfrom</tt>.
<tt>spf2.0/mfrom,pra</tt> instead of <tt>spf2.0/mfrom</tt>.
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This technical problem — in fact only four characters <tt>,pra</tt>
This technical problem — in fact only four characters <tt>,pra</tt>
in the core SenderID specification — was the base of an appeal to
in the core Sender ID specification — was the base of an appeal to
the [[Internet Architecture Board|Internet Architecture Board (IAB)]].
the [[Internet Architecture Board|Internet Architecture Board (IAB)]].
In response to another prior appeal the [[IESG]] already noted that
In response to another prior appeal the [[IESG]] already noted that
SenderID cannot advance on the [[IETF]] standards track without
Sender ID cannot advance on the [[IETF]] standards track without
addressing the incompatibility with a MUST in RFC 2822.
addressing the incompatibility with a MUST in RFC 2822.


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==External links==
==External links==
* [http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/safety/technologies/senderid/default.mspx ''Sender ID Framework''] [[Microsoft|Microsoft Corporation]]
* [http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/safety/technologies/senderid/default.mspx ''Sender ID Framework''] [[Microsoft|Microsoft Corporation]]
* [http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4406.txt ''Request for Comment 4406''] The Experimental RFC regarding Sender ID at the Internet Engineering Task Force
* http://emailauthentication.org "Overview of Authentication resources published by the Authentication & Online Trust Alliance (AOTA)
* http://emailauthentication.org "Overview of Authentication resources published by the Authentication & Online Trust Alliance (AOTA)
* http://www.microsoft.com/senderid " SIDF resources and tools including SPF wizard.
* http://www.microsoft.com/senderid " SIDF resources and tools including SPF wizard.
* [http://www.apache.org/foundation/docs/sender-id-position.html ''ASF Position Regarding Sender ID''] statement from the [[Apache Software Foundation]]
* [http://www.apache.org/foundation/docs/sender-id-position.html ''ASF Position Regarding Sender ID''] statement from the [[Apache Software Foundation]]
* [http://www.iab.org/appeals/2006-02-08-mehnle-appeal.html IAB appeal] about SenderID's reuse of <tt>v=spf1</tt> for PRA from the [http://new.openspf.org/ SPF project] (2006).
* [http://www.iab.org/appeals/2006-02-08-mehnle-appeal.html IAB appeal] about Sender ID's reuse of <tt>v=spf1</tt> for PRA from the [http://new.openspf.org/ SPF project] (2006).
* [http://www.debian.org/News/2004/20040904 ''Debian project unable to deploy Sender ID''] statement by the [[Debian]] project
* [http://www.debian.org/News/2004/20040904 ''Debian project unable to deploy Sender ID''] statement by the [[Debian]] project
* [http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/09/13/1317238 ''IETF Decides on SPF / Sender-ID issue''] coverage and discussion on [[slashdot]]
* [http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=04/09/13/1317238 ''IETF Decides on SPF / Sender-ID issue''] coverage and discussion on [[slashdot]]