WebAuthn: Difference between revisions
Edited the introduction to WebAuthn. This should make it clearer what this is about and incorporates some of the criticism from the talk page by more clearly stating how it can be implemented (software vs. hardware). |
m →Criticism: Elaborated on the "closed-source" approach of the development of this standard. |
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* The FIDO alliance standardized on an [[Public-key_cryptography|asymmetric cryptographic]] scheme called ECDAA.<ref name="ecdaa-spec">{{cite web|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/fido-ecdaa-algorithm-v2.0-id-20180227.html|title=FIDO ECDAA Algorithm|publisher=FIDO Alliance|date=2018-02-27|accessdate=2018-10-09}}</ref> This is a version of [[Direct_Anonymous_Attestation|direct anonymous attestation]] based on [[Elliptic_curve|elliptic curves]] and in the case of WebAuthn is meant to be used to verify the integrity of authenticators, while also preserving the privacy of users, as it does not allow for global correlation of handles. However, ECDAA does not incorporate some of the lessons that were learned in the last decades of research in the area of [[Elliptic-curve_cryptography|elliptic curve cryptography]], as the chosen curve has some security deficits that is inherent to this type of curves and reduces the security guarantees quite substantially. Furthermore the ECDAA standard involves random, non-deterministic, signatures, which already has been a problem in the past. | * The FIDO alliance standardized on an [[Public-key_cryptography|asymmetric cryptographic]] scheme called ECDAA.<ref name="ecdaa-spec">{{cite web|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/fido-ecdaa-algorithm-v2.0-id-20180227.html|title=FIDO ECDAA Algorithm|publisher=FIDO Alliance|date=2018-02-27|accessdate=2018-10-09}}</ref> This is a version of [[Direct_Anonymous_Attestation|direct anonymous attestation]] based on [[Elliptic_curve|elliptic curves]] and in the case of WebAuthn is meant to be used to verify the integrity of authenticators, while also preserving the privacy of users, as it does not allow for global correlation of handles. However, ECDAA does not incorporate some of the lessons that were learned in the last decades of research in the area of [[Elliptic-curve_cryptography|elliptic curve cryptography]], as the chosen curve has some security deficits that is inherent to this type of curves and reduces the security guarantees quite substantially. Furthermore the ECDAA standard involves random, non-deterministic, signatures, which already has been a problem in the past. | ||
Despite these shortcomings the researches still encourage users to continue to use WebAuthn, but came up with some recommendations for potential implementors and developers of the standard and hope that this can be fixed | The auditors from Paragon Initiative Enterprises also criticized the way in which the standard was initially developed, as the proposal was not made public in advance and experienced cryptographers were not asked for suggestions and feedback. Hence the standard was not subject to broad cryptographic research from the academic world. | ||
Despite these shortcomings the researches from Paragon Initiative Enterprises still encourage users to continue to use WebAuthn, but came up with some recommendations for potential implementors and developers of the standard and hope that this can be fixed, before the standard is finalized and therefore set in stone. Avoiding such mistakes as early as possible, will prevent the industry from any challenges that are introduced by broken standards and the need for [[Backward_compatibility|backwards compatibility]]. | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||