WebAuthn: Difference between revisions

Undid revision 899580731 by 2601:282:202:B210:459:DF80:59F1:192E (talk) These statements might be true, but a very unspecific. I don't understand what this is referring to, i.e. what kind of authenticators are not known (broken ones or fixed ones, etc.). This should be stated more explicitly.
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The main points of criticism revolve around two potential issues that were problematic in other cryptographic systems in the past and therefore should be avoided in order to not fall victim to the same class of attacks:
The main points of criticism revolve around two potential issues that were problematic in other cryptographic systems in the past and therefore should be avoided in order to not fall victim to the same class of attacks:


* Through the mandated use of COSE (RFC 8152) WebAuthn also supports [[RSA (cryptosystem)|RSA]] with [[PKCS 1|PKCS1v1.5 padding]]. This particular scheme of padding is known to be vulnerable to [[Adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack|specific attacks]] for at least twenty years and it has been successfully attacked in other protocols and implementations of the RSA cryptosystem in the past. It is difficult to exploit under the given conditions in the context of WebAuthn, but given that there are more secure cryptographic primitives and padding schemes, this is still a bad choice and is not considered to be best practice among cryptographers any more. There are no known authenticators which support the use of this scheme.
* Through the mandated use of COSE (RFC 8152) WebAuthn also supports [[RSA (cryptosystem)|RSA]] with [[PKCS 1|PKCS1v1.5 padding]]. This particular scheme of padding is known to be vulnerable to [[Adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack|specific attacks]] for at least twenty years and it has been successfully attacked in other protocols and implementations of the RSA cryptosystem in the past. It is difficult to exploit under the given conditions in the context of WebAuthn, but given that there are more secure cryptographic primitives and padding schemes, this is still a bad choice and is not considered to be best practice among cryptographers any more.
* The FIDO alliance standardized on an [[Public-key cryptography|asymmetric cryptographic]] scheme called ECDAA.<ref name="ecdaa-spec">{{cite web|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/fido-ecdaa-algorithm-v2.0-id-20180227.html|title=FIDO ECDAA Algorithm|publisher=FIDO Alliance|date=2018-02-27|accessdate=2018-10-09}}</ref> This is a version of [[Direct Anonymous Attestation|direct anonymous attestation]] based on [[elliptic curve]]s and in the case of WebAuthn is meant to be used to verify the integrity of authenticators, while also preserving the privacy of users, as it does not allow for global correlation of handles. However, ECDAA does not incorporate some of the lessons that were learned in the last decades of research in the area of [[Elliptic-curve cryptography|elliptic curve cryptography]], as the chosen curve has some security deficits inherent to this type of curve, which reduces the security guarantees quite substantially. Furthermore the ECDAA standard involves random, non-deterministic, signatures, which already has been a problem in the past. There are no known authenticators which support the use of this scheme. Furthermore, this scheme is not used to protect the authentication, rather used to attest the authenticity of the authenticator.
* The FIDO alliance standardized on an [[Public-key cryptography|asymmetric cryptographic]] scheme called ECDAA.<ref name="ecdaa-spec">{{cite web|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/fido-ecdaa-algorithm-v2.0-id-20180227.html|title=FIDO ECDAA Algorithm|publisher=FIDO Alliance|date=2018-02-27|accessdate=2018-10-09}}</ref> This is a version of [[Direct Anonymous Attestation|direct anonymous attestation]] based on [[elliptic curve]]s and in the case of WebAuthn is meant to be used to verify the integrity of authenticators, while also preserving the privacy of users, as it does not allow for global correlation of handles. However, ECDAA does not incorporate some of the lessons that were learned in the last decades of research in the area of [[Elliptic-curve cryptography|elliptic curve cryptography]], as the chosen curve has some security deficits inherent to this type of curve, which reduces the security guarantees quite substantially. Furthermore the ECDAA standard involves random, non-deterministic, signatures, which already has been a problem in the past.


Paragon Initiative Enterprises also criticized the way in which the standard was initially developed, as the proposal was not made public in advance and experienced cryptographers were not asked for suggestions and feedback. Hence the standard was not subject to broad cryptographic research from the academic world.
Paragon Initiative Enterprises also criticized the way in which the standard was initially developed, as the proposal was not made public in advance and experienced cryptographers were not asked for suggestions and feedback. Hence the standard was not subject to broad cryptographic research from the academic world.