Hardware keylogger: Difference between revisions

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'''Hardware Keyloggers''' can be used for [[Keystroke logging]]. They plug in between a computer keyboard and a computer and log all keyboard activity on an internal memory. They are typically designed to have an innocuous appearance that blends in with the rest of the hardware. For example, Keyghost produces one that is "injection moulded to look exactly like an [[EMC]] [[Balun]]"<ref>[http://www.keyghost.com/ Keyghost].</ref>.
'''Hardware Keyloggers''' can be used for [[Keystroke logging]]. They plug in between a computer keyboard and a computer and log all keyboard activity on an internal memory.


They are designed to work with [[PS/2 connector|PS/2]] keyboards, and more recently with [[USB]] keyboards.
They are designed to work with [[PS/2 connector|PS/2]] keyboards, and more recently with [[USB]] keyboards.
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On the whole the recorded data is retrieved by typing a special password into a computer text editor. As the hardware keylogger is plugged in-between the keyboard and computer, it detects the password has been typed and then starts presenting the computer with "typed" data to produce a menu. Beyond text menu some keyloggers offer a high-speed download to speed up retrieval of stored data, this can be via USB mass-storage enumeration or with a USB or serial download adapter.
On the whole the recorded data is retrieved by typing a special password into a computer text editor. As the hardware keylogger is plugged in-between the keyboard and computer, it detects the password has been typed and then starts presenting the computer with "typed" data to produce a menu. Beyond text menu some keyloggers offer a high-speed download to speed up retrieval of stored data, this can be via USB mass-storage enumeration or with a USB or serial download adapter.
==Countermeasures==
Denial of [[physical access]] to sensitive computers, e.g. by locking the server room, is the most effective means of preventing hardware keylogger installation. Visual inspection is the primary means of detecting hardware keyloggers, since there are no known methods of detecting them through software. In cases in which the CPU is hidden from view (e.g. at some public access kiosks where the CPU is in a locked box and only a monitor, keyboard, and mouse are exposed to view), a user might thwart a keylogger by typing part of a password, using the mouse to move to a text editor or other window, typing some garbage text, mousing back to the password window, typing the next part of the password, etc. so that the keylogger will record an unintelligible mix of garbage and password text.
The main risk associated with keylogger use is that physical access is needed twice: initially to install the keylogger, and secondly to retrieve it. Thus, if the victim discovers the keylogger, they can then set up a [[sting operation]] to catch the person in the act of retrieving it. This could include surveillance or the use of automated security methods (e.g. [[Datawatch Systems|Datawatch]] access card swipe records) to determine who gained physical access to the area during the time period that the keylogger was removed.
==References==
{{reflist}}


[[Category:Cryptographic attacks]]
[[Category:Cryptographic attacks]]
[[Category:Surveillance]]
[[Category:Surveillance]]