Hardware keylogger: Difference between revisions
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==Countermeasures== | ==Countermeasures== | ||
Denial or monitoring of [[physical access]] to sensitive computers, e.g. by closed-circuit video surveillance and access control, is the most effective means of preventing hardware keylogger installation. Visual inspection is the easiest way of detecting hardware keyloggers. But there are also some techniques that can be used for most hardware keyloggers on the market, to detect them via software. In cases in which the computer case is hidden from view (e.g. at some public access kiosks where the case is in a locked box and only a monitor, keyboard, and mouse are exposed to view) and the user has no possibility to run software checks, a user might thwart a keylogger by typing part of a password, using the mouse to move to a text editor or other window, typing some garbage text, mousing back to the password window, typing the next part of the password, etc. so that the keylogger will record an unintelligible mix of garbage and password text<ref>[http://spycop.com/keyloggerremoval.htm Hardware Keylogger Detection] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120209130338/http://spycop.com/keyloggerremoval.htm |date=2012-02-09 }}, SpyCop.</ref> | Denial or monitoring of [[physical access]] to sensitive computers, e.g. by closed-circuit video surveillance and access control, is the most effective means of preventing hardware keylogger installation. Visual inspection is the easiest way of detecting hardware keyloggers. But there are also some techniques that can be used for most hardware keyloggers on the market, to detect them via software. In cases in which the computer case is hidden from view (e.g. at some public access kiosks where the case is in a locked box and only a monitor, keyboard, and mouse are exposed to view) and the user has no possibility to run software checks, a user might thwart a keylogger by typing part of a password, using the mouse to move to a text editor or other window, typing some garbage text, mousing back to the password window, typing the next part of the password, etc. so that the keylogger will record an unintelligible mix of garbage and password text.<ref>[http://spycop.com/keyloggerremoval.htm Hardware Keylogger Detection] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120209130338/http://spycop.com/keyloggerremoval.htm |date=2012-02-09 }}, SpyCop.</ref> General ''[[Keystroke logging#Countermeasures|keystroke logging countermeasures]]'' are also options against hardware keyloggers. | ||
The main risk associated with keylogger use is that physical access is needed twice: initially to install the keylogger, and secondly to retrieve it. Thus, if the victim discovers the keylogger, they can then set up a [[sting operation]] to catch the person in the act of retrieving it. This could include camera surveillance or the review of access card swipe records to determine who gained physical access to the area during the time period that the keylogger was removed. | The main risk associated with keylogger use is that physical access is needed twice: initially to install the keylogger, and secondly to retrieve it. Thus, if the victim discovers the keylogger, they can then set up a [[sting operation]] to catch the person in the act of retrieving it. This could include camera surveillance or the review of access card swipe records to determine who gained physical access to the area during the time period that the keylogger was removed. | ||