Defense strategy (computing): Difference between revisions
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=== Secure enclave Strategy Analysis === | === Secure enclave Strategy Analysis === | ||
Supporting strategy for Boundary protection | Supporting strategy for Boundary protection ,Information System Monitoring and Unavoidable actions strategy. Time and Resources consuming strategy, the scope is known. Strategy can be fully successful in its part, which does not guarantee overall success. | ||
=== False target Strategy Analysis === | === False target Strategy Analysis === | ||
Revision as of 17:29, 14 December 2019
Template:Copy edit Defense strategy (in computing) is a concept and form of practice used by computer designers, users, and IT personnel to help reduce the risk of computer security or cyber-security problems.[1]
Common Strategies
Boundary protection employs different security measures and devices to prevent unauthorized access to computer systems (controlling system border). The approach is based on the assumption that the attacker did not penetrate the system. Examples of this strategy are using Firewall (computing), password check, deleting suspicious emails/messages, using gateways and routers, and limiting physical access.
Information System Monitoring employs different security measures to find intruders or damage done by intruders. This strategy is used when the system has been penetrated, but the intruder did not gain full control. Examples of this strategy include antivirus software, Patch (computing), and Network behavior anomaly detection.
Unavoidable actions employ different security measures that cannot be prevented or neutralized. It's a strategy based on the assumption that the system has been penetrated, but an intruder cannot access a defensive mechanism. Examples of this strategy include computer Reboot, using Physical unclonable function, and using a Security switch.
Secure enclave employs different security measures that prevent access to some parts of the system. This strategy is used when the system has been penetrated, but an intruder cannot access its special parts. Examples of this strategy include using the Access level, using a Trusted Platform Module, using a microkernel, using Diode (unidirectional network device), and Air gap (networking).
False target is a strategy that prepares non-real targets for an intruder. It is used when the system has been penetrated, but the intruder does not know the system architecture. Examples of this strategy include Honeypot (computing), Virtual Computer, Virtual security switch, fake files, and addresses/passwords copies.
Moving target is a security strategy based on frequent changes of data and processes. This strategy is based on the assumption that the system has been penetrated, but the intruder does not know the architecture of the system and its processes. Examples of this strategy are regular changes of passwords or keys (cryptography), using a dynamic platform, etc.
Useless information comprises different security measures to turn important information into useless data for an intruder. The strategy is based on the assumption that the system has been penetrated, but the intruder is not able to decrypt information, or does not have enough time to decrypt it. For example, encrypting the file system, using encryption software, can render the data useless in case an attacker gets access to the file system.
Delete- strategy performing different security measures preventing an intruder from gaining sensitive information at all costs. Strategy based on the assumption that damage from information disclosure is more than system integrity. Assuming the system may be penetrated, an attempt is detected. The strategy is part of the Data-centric security approach. Examples of this strategy are information deletion as a response to a security violation, unauthorized access attempt, password reset.
Information redundancy -strategy performing different security measures to keep redundancy for information and using it in case of damage. Strategy based on the assumption that finding and repairing the damage is more complicated than the restoration of the system. Examples of this strategy are using system restoration, keeping backup files, using a backup computer.
Limiting of actions made by a robot - strategy performing different security measures to limit robots (software bot) actions. Strategy based on the assumption that a robot can take more actions, or create damage that a human cannot create. Examples of this strategy are using Anti-spam techniques, using CAPTCHA and other Human presence detection techniques, using DDS{{dn|date=December 2019) based defense (protection from Denial-of-service attack).
Active defense - strategy performing different security measures attacking the potential intruders. Strategy based on the assumption that potential intruder under attack has fewer abilities. Examples of this strategy are creating and using lists of trusted networks, devices, applications, blocking addresses, Vendor Management.
Strategy Analysis
Boundary protection Strategy Analysis
The main strategy for computing system, if this type of defense is successful, no other strategies are required. Resources consuming strategy, the scope is known. External information system monitoring is part of Boundary protection.[2]
Information System Monitoring Strategy Analysis
Strategy success based on competition of offense and defense. Time and Resources consuming strategy, affecting performance. The scope is variable in time. It cannot be fully successful if not supported by other strategies.
Unavoidable actions Strategy Analysis
Strategy can support any other strategy.[3],[4],[5],[6]Template:Huh Resources consuming strategy, the scope is determined by the designer. Implementation may have wide impact on device.[7] Strategy can be fully successful, however, in most cases, it is limiting system functionality. Strategy can be used proactively or reactively. Actions,that are done as response to detected problem may be done too late.[8]
Secure enclave Strategy Analysis
Supporting strategy for Boundary protection ,Information System Monitoring and Unavoidable actions strategy. Time and Resources consuming strategy, the scope is known. Strategy can be fully successful in its part, which does not guarantee overall success.
False target Strategy Analysis
Supporting strategy for Information System Monitoring. Time-consuming strategy, the scope is determined by the designer. It cannot be fully successful if not supported by other strategies.
Moving target Strategy Analysis
Supporting strategy for Information System Monitoring. Time-consuming strategy, the scope is determined by the designer. It cannot be fully successful if not supported by other strategies.
Useless information Strategy Analysis
Supporting strategy for Information System Monitoring. Time and Resources consuming strategy, affecting performance. The scope is known. It cannot be successful if not supported by other strategies. Consequences of Claude Shannon theorems show that if the encryption key is smaller than secured information, the Information-theoretic security can not be achieved. There is only one known unbreakable cryptographic system, the one-time pad. This strategy is not generally possible to use because of the difficulties involved in exchanging one-time pads without the risk of being compromised. Other cryptographic systems are only buying time or can be broken. This strategy needs to be supported by Moving target strategy or Delete strategy.
Delete Strategy Analysis
Supporting strategy for Information System Monitoring. Resources consuming strategy, the scope is determined by the designer. It cannot be fully successful since detection is not quarantined.
Information redundancy Strategy Analysis
Supporting strategy for Information System Monitoring. Considerable resources consuming strategy, the scope is known. It can be fully successful in its part.
Limiting of actions made by robots Strategy Analysis
Supporting strategy for Boundary protection and Information System Monitoring. Time and Resources consuming strategy, the scope is determined by the designer. Strategy cannot be fully successful.
Active defense Strategy Analysis
Supporting strategy for Boundary protection and Information System Monitoring. Time and Resources consuming strategy, the scope is determined by the designer. Strategy cannot be fully successful.
See also
- Firewall (computing)
- Antivirus software
- Patch (computing)
- Security switch
- Physical unclonable function
- Access level
- Trusted Platform Module
- Honeypot (computing)
- Virtual Computer
- Virtual security switch
- Encryption software
- Data-centric security
- Anti-spam techniques
- CAPTCHA
- Human presence detection
- Information-theoretic security
- Strong cryptography
- Network behavior anomaly detection
References
- ↑ "Defensive Strategy - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics". https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/defensive-strategy.
- ↑ SI-4 INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING, NIST Special Publication 800-53
- ↑ Best two-factor Authentication
- ↑ PUF based encryption
- ↑ Design and implementation of Hardware assisted security architecture for software integrity monitoring
- ↑ Real-time Captcha technique improves biometric authentication
- ↑ Adding kill switches to protect your privacy is not as simple as you might think
- ↑ Consumer Watchdog raises the alarm about connected cars with misguided report