Defense strategy (computing): Difference between revisions
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== | '''Defense strategy''' is a concept and practice to help reduce the risk of [[computer security]] or cyber-security problems.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/defensive-strategy|title=Defensive Strategy - an overview {{!}} ScienceDirect Topics|website=www.sciencedirect.com|access-date=2019-12-04}}</ref> It is used by computer designers, users and IT personnel. | ||
==Boundary protection== | |||
''' | ''Boundary protection'' attempts to prevent unauthorized access to computer systems (referred to as controlling the system border). The approach assumes that the attacker did not penetrate the system. Examples methods include [[Gateway (telecommunications)|gateways]], [[Router (computing)|routers]], [[Firewall (computing)|firewalls]], and [[password]] checks, deleting suspicious emails/messages and limiting physical access. This strategy consumes significant resources. External information system monitoring is part of boundary protection.<ref>[https://nvd.nist.gov/800-53/Rev4/control/SI-4 SI-4 INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING, NIST Special Publication 800-53]</ref> | ||
'' | == Information system monitoring == | ||
''Information system monitoring'' attempts to find intruders or damage done by intruders. This strategy is used when the system was penetrated, but the intruder did not gain full control. Examples include [[antivirus software]], [[Patch (computing)|patching software]] and [[network behavior anomaly detection]]. This strategy includes offense and defense. It is time and resource-consuming, and slows performance. It is variable in time. To be fully successful, it must be complement by other strategies. | |||
'' | == Unavoidable actions == | ||
''Unavoidable actions'' employ security measures that cannot be prevented or neutralized. This strategy assumes that the system was penetrated, but that the intruder cannot defeat the defensive measure. Examples include [[reboot]]ing, using [[physical unclonable function]] and using a [[security switch]]. This strategy can support any other strategy.<ref>[https://www.pcworld.com/article/3225913/what-is-two-factor-authentication-and-which-2fa-apps-are-best.html Best two-factor Authentication]</ref><ref>[https://www.researchgate.net/figure/A-PUF-Based-Encryption-Scheme_fig3_314296637 PUF based encryption]</ref><ref>[https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01322882/document Design and implementation of Hardware-assisted security architecture for software integrity monitoring]</ref><ref>[https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/02/180219141219.htm Real-time Captcha technique improves biometric authentication]</ref>{{clarify|date=December 2019}} It is a resource-consuming strategy, with scope determined by the designer. Implementation may have a wide impact on devices.<ref>[https://amosbbatto.wordpress.com/2019/08/15/adding-switches-not-simple/ Adding kill switches to protect your privacy is not as simple as you might think]</ref> This strategy can be fully successful, but in most cases, impacts system functionality. It can be used [[proactive]]ly or reactively, although the latter may be too late.<ref>[https://arstechnica.com/cars/2019/10/should-all-connected-cars-have-a-physical-network-kill-switch/ Consumer Watchdog raises the alarm about connected cars with misguided report]</ref> Implementation must be supported by the secure enclave strategy to prevent the intruder from disabling the protection mechanism. | |||
Actions can be: | |||
*Preventive - blocking selected functions, signals, peripheral devices, memory parts, and/or data transfers. For example: blocking audio/video recording, the sending of long messages, or secret memory access. | |||
*Creative - activating functions, sending signals, messages, and/or data. For example: sending an alarm signal or message, or activating data copying or transfer. | |||
*Modification - modifying a peripheral device's functioning, or modifying data, signals or processes of the defended system. For example, independent hardware encryption/decryption, changing accelerometer accuracy, filtering messages or words, or changing [[state diagram]] or [[algorithm]] by independent hardware. | |||
''' | == Secure enclave == | ||
''Secure enclave'' prevents access to some parts of the system. This strategy is used when the system was penetrated, but an intruder cannot access the protected parts. Examples include elevated [[Access level|access levels]], [[Trusted Platform Module]], operating system [[microkernel]], Diode (unidirectional network device), and [[Air gap (networking)|air gaps]]. | |||
This is a supporting strategy for boundary protection, information system monitoring and unavoidable action strategies. It consumes time and resources. Its scope is known. Even if it is fully successful in its role, it does not guarantee the success of the overall defense strategy. | |||
''' | == False target == | ||
''False target'' offers fake system elements to an intruder. It is used when the system was penetrated, but the intruder does not know the system architecture. Examples include [[Honeypot (computing)|honeypots]], [[Virtual Computer|virtual computers]], [[virtual security switch]]es, fake files and address/password copies. | |||
This is a supporting strategy for information system monitoring. It is a time-consuming strategy. Its scope is determined by the designer. It requires complementary strategies to succeed. | |||
'' | == Moving target == | ||
''Moving target'' employs frequent changes of data and processes. It is used when the system was penetrated, but the intruder does not know the system architecture and processes. Examples include regular changes of [[password]]s or [[Key (cryptography)|keys]] and using a dynamic platform. | |||
This is a supporting strategy for information system monitoring. It is a time-consuming strategy. Its scope is determined by the designer. It requires complementary strategies to succeed. Actions are activated on a scheduled basis or in response to a detected threat. | |||
== | == Useless information == | ||
''Useless information'' employs measures to make important information useless to an intruder even after it is accessed. The strategy assumes that the system was penetrated, but that the intruder for some reason cannot decrypt the information. For example, [[Encrypting File System|encrypting the file system]] can protect sensitive data. Another approach is [[data masking]], where sensitive data is hidden in non-sensitive data, but is masked to protect it. | |||
This is a supporting strategy for information system monitoring. It consumes time and resource and affects performance. The scope is known. It requires complementary strategies to succeed. [[Claude Shannon|Claude Shannon's]] theorems show that if the encryption key is smaller than the secured information, [[information-theoretic security]] can not be achieved.{{Cn|date=January 2020}} One unbreakable cryptographic system is known: the [[one-time pad]].{{Cn|date=January 2020}} Other cryptographic systems can be broken. This strategy must be complemented by the moving target or deletion strategies. | |||
== | == Deletion == | ||
''Deletion'' destroys data to prevent an intruder from accessing it. It is used when the damage from information disclosure would be greater than the damage caused by deleting the information or disabling the system required to access it. The strategy is part of the [[data-centric security]] approach. Deletion occurs in response to a security violation (such as unauthorized access attempts) before the data is accessed. | |||
This | This is a supporting strategy for information system monitoring. It consumes resources. Its scope is determined by the designer. It cannot be fully successful on its own, since the detected intrusion is not quarantined. | ||
== | == Information redundancy == | ||
''Information redundancy'' employs logs or backup copies to prevent information loss. The strategy assumes that finding and repairing damage is less practical than restoring the system from a copy. Examples include system restoration, backup files and backup computers. | |||
This is a supporting strategy for information system monitoring. This strategy consumes considerable resources. Its scope is known. | |||
== | == Limiting bot actions == | ||
''Limiting bot actions'' limits the actions a [[Software bot|bot]] can take to compromise security. The strategy assumes that a bot can take actions that would otherwise provide unauthorized access. Examples include [[anti-spam techniques]], [[CAPTCHA]] and other [[human presence detection]] techniques, and using a Denial of Service defense system to protect from a [[denial-of-service attack]]. | |||
This is a supporting strategy for boundary protection | This is a supporting strategy for boundary protection and information system monitoring. It consumes time and resources. Its scope is determined by the designer. It cannot be fully successful on its own. | ||
== | == Active defense == | ||
''Active defense'' attacks intruders. The strategy assumes that attacking an intruder reduces the strength of the intrusion. Examples include using lists of trusted networks, devices and applications, blocking untrusted addresses and vendor management. | |||
This is a supporting strategy for boundary protection and information system monitoring. It consumes time and resources. Its scope is determined by the designer. This strategy cannot be fully successful on its own. | |||
This is a supporting strategy for boundary protection and information system monitoring. It | |||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
Revision as of 23:16, 25 January 2020
Defense strategy is a concept and practice to help reduce the risk of computer security or cyber-security problems.[1] It is used by computer designers, users and IT personnel.
Boundary protection
Boundary protection attempts to prevent unauthorized access to computer systems (referred to as controlling the system border). The approach assumes that the attacker did not penetrate the system. Examples methods include gateways, routers, firewalls, and password checks, deleting suspicious emails/messages and limiting physical access. This strategy consumes significant resources. External information system monitoring is part of boundary protection.[2]
Information system monitoring
Information system monitoring attempts to find intruders or damage done by intruders. This strategy is used when the system was penetrated, but the intruder did not gain full control. Examples include antivirus software, patching software and network behavior anomaly detection. This strategy includes offense and defense. It is time and resource-consuming, and slows performance. It is variable in time. To be fully successful, it must be complement by other strategies.
Unavoidable actions
Unavoidable actions employ security measures that cannot be prevented or neutralized. This strategy assumes that the system was penetrated, but that the intruder cannot defeat the defensive measure. Examples include rebooting, using physical unclonable function and using a security switch. This strategy can support any other strategy.[3][4][5][6]Template:Clarify It is a resource-consuming strategy, with scope determined by the designer. Implementation may have a wide impact on devices.[7] This strategy can be fully successful, but in most cases, impacts system functionality. It can be used proactively or reactively, although the latter may be too late.[8] Implementation must be supported by the secure enclave strategy to prevent the intruder from disabling the protection mechanism.
Actions can be:
- Preventive - blocking selected functions, signals, peripheral devices, memory parts, and/or data transfers. For example: blocking audio/video recording, the sending of long messages, or secret memory access.
- Creative - activating functions, sending signals, messages, and/or data. For example: sending an alarm signal or message, or activating data copying or transfer.
- Modification - modifying a peripheral device's functioning, or modifying data, signals or processes of the defended system. For example, independent hardware encryption/decryption, changing accelerometer accuracy, filtering messages or words, or changing state diagram or algorithm by independent hardware.
Secure enclave
Secure enclave prevents access to some parts of the system. This strategy is used when the system was penetrated, but an intruder cannot access the protected parts. Examples include elevated access levels, Trusted Platform Module, operating system microkernel, Diode (unidirectional network device), and air gaps.
This is a supporting strategy for boundary protection, information system monitoring and unavoidable action strategies. It consumes time and resources. Its scope is known. Even if it is fully successful in its role, it does not guarantee the success of the overall defense strategy.
False target
False target offers fake system elements to an intruder. It is used when the system was penetrated, but the intruder does not know the system architecture. Examples include honeypots, virtual computers, virtual security switches, fake files and address/password copies.
This is a supporting strategy for information system monitoring. It is a time-consuming strategy. Its scope is determined by the designer. It requires complementary strategies to succeed.
Moving target
Moving target employs frequent changes of data and processes. It is used when the system was penetrated, but the intruder does not know the system architecture and processes. Examples include regular changes of passwords or keys and using a dynamic platform.
This is a supporting strategy for information system monitoring. It is a time-consuming strategy. Its scope is determined by the designer. It requires complementary strategies to succeed. Actions are activated on a scheduled basis or in response to a detected threat.
Useless information
Useless information employs measures to make important information useless to an intruder even after it is accessed. The strategy assumes that the system was penetrated, but that the intruder for some reason cannot decrypt the information. For example, encrypting the file system can protect sensitive data. Another approach is data masking, where sensitive data is hidden in non-sensitive data, but is masked to protect it.
This is a supporting strategy for information system monitoring. It consumes time and resource and affects performance. The scope is known. It requires complementary strategies to succeed. Claude Shannon's theorems show that if the encryption key is smaller than the secured information, information-theoretic security can not be achieved.Template:Cn One unbreakable cryptographic system is known: the one-time pad.Template:Cn Other cryptographic systems can be broken. This strategy must be complemented by the moving target or deletion strategies.
Deletion
Deletion destroys data to prevent an intruder from accessing it. It is used when the damage from information disclosure would be greater than the damage caused by deleting the information or disabling the system required to access it. The strategy is part of the data-centric security approach. Deletion occurs in response to a security violation (such as unauthorized access attempts) before the data is accessed.
This is a supporting strategy for information system monitoring. It consumes resources. Its scope is determined by the designer. It cannot be fully successful on its own, since the detected intrusion is not quarantined.
Information redundancy
Information redundancy employs logs or backup copies to prevent information loss. The strategy assumes that finding and repairing damage is less practical than restoring the system from a copy. Examples include system restoration, backup files and backup computers.
This is a supporting strategy for information system monitoring. This strategy consumes considerable resources. Its scope is known.
Limiting bot actions
Limiting bot actions limits the actions a bot can take to compromise security. The strategy assumes that a bot can take actions that would otherwise provide unauthorized access. Examples include anti-spam techniques, CAPTCHA and other human presence detection techniques, and using a Denial of Service defense system to protect from a denial-of-service attack.
This is a supporting strategy for boundary protection and information system monitoring. It consumes time and resources. Its scope is determined by the designer. It cannot be fully successful on its own.
Active defense
Active defense attacks intruders. The strategy assumes that attacking an intruder reduces the strength of the intrusion. Examples include using lists of trusted networks, devices and applications, blocking untrusted addresses and vendor management.
This is a supporting strategy for boundary protection and information system monitoring. It consumes time and resources. Its scope is determined by the designer. This strategy cannot be fully successful on its own.
See also
- Firewall (computing)
- Antivirus software
- Patch (computing)
- Security switch
- Physical unclonable function
- Access level
- Trusted Platform Module
- Honeypot (computing)
- Virtual Computer
- Virtual security switch
- Encryption software
- Data-centric security
- Anti-spam techniques
- CAPTCHA
- Human presence detection
- Information-theoretic security
- Strong cryptography
- Network behavior anomaly detection
References
- ↑ "Defensive Strategy - an overview | ScienceDirect Topics". https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/defensive-strategy.
- ↑ SI-4 INFORMATION SYSTEM MONITORING, NIST Special Publication 800-53
- ↑ Best two-factor Authentication
- ↑ PUF based encryption
- ↑ Design and implementation of Hardware-assisted security architecture for software integrity monitoring
- ↑ Real-time Captcha technique improves biometric authentication
- ↑ Adding kill switches to protect your privacy is not as simple as you might think
- ↑ Consumer Watchdog raises the alarm about connected cars with misguided report