Sender ID: Difference between revisions
→External links: replaced old "cat fight" by newer IAB appeal |
→See also: added "Principles of Operation" |
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The [[MARID]] [[IETF]] working group stopped their work on the proposed standard on [[September 23]] [[2004]] because of various problems and major differences between the members of the group. | The [[MARID]] [[IETF]] working group stopped their work on the proposed standard on [[September 23]] [[2004]] because of various problems and major differences between the members of the group. | ||
== Principles of Operation == | |||
Syntactically SPF and SenderID are almost identical: | |||
Replacing the string <tt>v=spf1</tt> in a valid SPF | |||
poiicy by one of... | |||
# <tt>spf2.0/mfrom</tt> | |||
# <tt>spf2.0/mfrom,pra</tt> | |||
# <tt>spf2.0/pra,mfrom</tt> | |||
# <tt>spf2.0/pra</tt> | |||
...yields a syntactically valid SenderID policy, and | |||
vice versa. The evaluation of SPF and SenderID policies | |||
follows the same general rules. The core SenderID | |||
specification has a normative reference to the SPF | |||
specification and thereby inherits exactly the same error | |||
handling, the same processing limits, and the same syntax | |||
details as SPF. | |||
Semantically there are only two differences: SenderID offers | |||
the feature of ''positional'' modifiers not supported in SPF. | |||
In practice so far no ''positional'' modifier was specified, | |||
let alone supported in any SenderID implementation. | |||
Except from this detail <tt>spf2.0/mfrom</tt> is semantically | |||
the same as SPF, ''mfrom'' stands for MAIL FROM, the checked | |||
identity in SPF. Because SPF is wider deployed than the later | |||
proposed <tt>spf2.0/mfrom</tt> publishers of sender policies | |||
wishing to protect their address in MAIL FROM Return-Paths | |||
generally prefer the classic <tt>v=spf1</tt> format. | |||
Both <tt>spf2.0/mfrom,pra</tt> and <tt>spf2.0/pra,mfrom</tt> | |||
have the same meaning, they introduce a policy that can be | |||
used to check the ''mfrom'' as well as the ''pra'' identity. | |||
Last but not least <tt>spf2.0/pra</tt> introduces policies | |||
checked only with the ''pra'' identity. At this time it is | |||
not specified how SPF's <nowiki>%{h}</nowiki> macro for the | |||
HELO identity should be handled in ''pra'' checks, SenderID | |||
implementations could handle it as syntax error. | |||
The Purported Responsible Address or ''pra'' is determined | |||
by a tricky evaluation of the four mail header fields... | |||
* <tt>From</tt>, | |||
* <tt>Sender</tt>, | |||
* <tt>Resent-From</tt>, | |||
* <tt>Resent-Sender</tt>. | |||
...finally resulting either in one address, the ''pra'', or | |||
an error for illegal combinations as explained in [[RFC]] | |||
[http://tools.ietf.org/html/2822 2822]. | |||
Simplified the rules are <tt>Sender</tt> beats <tt>From</tt> | |||
and <tt>Resent-</tt>* beats <tt>Sender</tt>. Note that it's | |||
illegal to have more than one <tt>From</tt>-address without a | |||
single <tt>Sender</tt>-address. | |||
This ''pra'' scheme has the advantage to deal with addresses | |||
in header fields normally displayed by MUAs (mail user agents), | |||
unlike SPF's Return-Path (''mfrom'' in SenderID terminology). | |||
The ''pra'' tries to counter the problem of ''phishing'', | |||
while SPF or ''mfrom'' tries to counter the problem of spam | |||
bounces and other auto-replies to forged Return-Paths. Two | |||
different problems with two different proposed solutions. | |||
OTOH ''pra'' has the severe disadvantage that forwarders and | |||
mailing lists can only support it by modifying the mail header, | |||
e.g. insert a <tt>Sender</tt> or <tt>Resent-Sender</tt>. The | |||
latter violates RFC 2821 and can be incompatible with RFC 821. | |||
With SPF mailing lists continue to work as is, and forwarders | |||
wishing to support SPF only need to modify the SMTP MAIL FROM | |||
in addition to the RCPT TO, not the mail. And that's no unheard | |||
of new concept, with the original RFC 821 SMTP forwarder always | |||
added their host name to the reverse path in the MAIL FROM. | |||
The most problematic point in the core SenderID specification | |||
is its recommendation to interpret <tt>v=spf1</tt> policies like | |||
<tt>spf2.0/mfrom,pra</tt> instead of <tt>spf2.0/mfrom</tt>. | |||
This was never intended by all published SPF drafts since 2003, | |||
and for an unknown large number of <tt>v=spf1</tt> policies an | |||
evaluation for ''pra'' could cause bogus results for many cases | |||
where ''pra'' and ''mfrom'' are different. | |||
This technical problem - in fact only four letters <tt>,pra</tt> | |||
in the core SenderID specification - caused the eighth appeal to | |||
the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) in the Internet history. | |||
In response to a prior appeal the [[IESG]] already noted that | |||
SenderID cannot advance on the [[IETF]] standards track without | |||
addressing the incompatibility with a MUST in RFC 2822. | |||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||