WebAuthn: Difference between revisions

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{{short description|Public-key authentication standard}}
{{short description|Public-key authentication standard}}
[[File:FIDO2 push-button and fingerprint biometric security keys USB.png|alt=WebAuthn push-button and fingerprint biometric security keys (USB) by KEY-ID|thumb|FIDO2 USB security keys: fingerprint biometric and push-button]]
[[File:FIDO2 push-button and fingerprint biometric security keys USB.png|alt=WebAuthn push-button and fingerprint biometric security keys (USB) by KEY-ID|thumb|FIDO2 USB security keys: fingerprint biometric and push-button]]
'''Web Authentication''' ('''WebAuthn''') is a [[web standard]] published by the [[World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C).<ref name="W3C-WebAuthn">{{cite web |editor1-last=Balfanz |editor1-first=Dirk |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Hodges |editor3-first=Jeff |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=J.C. |editor5-last=Jones |editor5-first=Michael B. |editor6-last=Kumar |editor6-first=Akshay |editor7-last=Liao |editor7-first=Angelo |editor8-last=Lindemann |editor8-first=Rolf |editor9-last=Lundberg |editor9-first=Emil |title=Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials Level 1 |url=https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-1/ |publisher=[[World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C) |accessdate=4 March 2019 |publication-date=4 March 2019 |edition=Recommendation }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.w3.org/blog/webauthn/ |title=Web Authentication Working Group |publisher=[[World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C) |accessdate=2018-05-11}}</ref><ref>{{cite episode |title=What is WebAuthn |series=TechStuff |publisher=[[iHeartMedia]] |series-link=HowStuffWorks#TechStuff |first=Jonathan |last=Strickland |network= |date=18 March 2019 |url=https://www.iheart.com/podcast/105-techstuff-26941194/episode/what-is-webauthn-30705004/ |minutes=20:35 |access-date=20 March 2019}}</ref> WebAuthn is a core component of the [[FIDO2 Project]] under the guidance of the [[FIDO Alliance]].<ref name="fido2">{{cite web|url=https://fidoalliance.org/fido2/|title=FIDO2 Project|publisher=FIDO Alliance|accessdate=2018-05-11}}</ref> The goal of the project is to standardize an interface for authenticating users to web-based applications and services using [[public-key cryptography]].
'''Web Authentication''' ('''WebAuthn''') is a [[web standard]] published by the [[World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C).<ref name="W3C-WebAuthn">{{cite web |editor1-last=Balfanz |editor1-first=Dirk |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Hodges |editor3-first=Jeff |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=J.C. |editor5-last=Jones |editor5-first=Michael B. |editor6-last=Kumar |editor6-first=Akshay |editor7-last=Liao |editor7-first=Angelo |editor8-last=Lindemann |editor8-first=Rolf |editor9-last=Lundberg |editor9-first=Emil |title=Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials Level 1 |url=https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-1/ |publisher=[[World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C) |access-date=4 March 2019 |publication-date=4 March 2019 |edition=Recommendation }}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.w3.org/blog/webauthn/ |title=Web Authentication Working Group |publisher=[[World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C) |access-date=2018-05-11}}</ref><ref>{{cite episode |title=What is WebAuthn |series=TechStuff |publisher=[[iHeartMedia]] |series-link=HowStuffWorks#TechStuff |first=Jonathan |last=Strickland |date=18 March 2019 |url=https://www.iheart.com/podcast/105-techstuff-26941194/episode/what-is-webauthn-30705004/ |minutes=20:35 |access-date=20 March 2019}}</ref> WebAuthn is a core component of the [[FIDO2 Project]] under the guidance of the [[FIDO Alliance]].<ref name="fido2">{{cite web|url=https://fidoalliance.org/fido2/|title=FIDO2 Project|publisher=FIDO Alliance|access-date=2018-05-11}}</ref> The goal of the project is to standardize an interface for authenticating users to web-based applications and services using [[public-key cryptography]].


[[File:Roaming_Cryptographic_Authenticator.svg|thumb|right|A roaming cryptographic hardware authenticator with a USB interface]]
[[File:Roaming_Cryptographic_Authenticator.svg|thumb|right|A roaming cryptographic hardware authenticator with a USB interface]]


On the client side, support for WebAuthn can be implemented in a variety of ways. The underlying cryptographic operations are performed by an [[authenticator]],<ref>{{cite web |last1=Stenius |first1=Petteri |title=Introduction to FIDO (Fast IDentity Online) |url=https://www.ubisecure.com/authentication/fido-introduction/ |publisher=Ubisecure |accessdate=30 April 2019 |date=20 February 2019}}</ref> which is an abstract functional model that is mostly agnostic with respect to how the key material is managed. This makes it possible to implement support for WebAuthn purely in software, making use of a processor's [[trusted execution environment]] or a [[Trusted Platform Module]] (TPM). Sensitive cryptographic operations can also be offloaded to a roaming hardware authenticator that can in turn be accessed via [[USB]], [[Bluetooth Low Energy]], or [[near-field communication]]s (NFC). A roaming hardware authenticator conforms to the FIDO [[Client to Authenticator Protocol]] (CTAP),<ref name="FIDO-CTAP">{{cite web |editor1-last=Brand |editor1-first=Christiaan |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Ehrensvärd |editor3-first=Jakob |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=Michael B. |editor5-last=Kumar |editor5-first=Akshay |editor6-last=Lindemann |editor6-first=Rolf |editor7-last=Powers |editor7-first=Adam |editor8-last=Verrept |editor8-first=Johan |title=Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) |url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |publisher=FIDO Alliance |accessdate=7 March 2019 |date=January 30, 2019}}</ref> making WebAuthn effectively backward compatible with the FIDO [[Universal 2nd Factor]] (U2F) standard.<ref>{{cite web |title=WebAuthn / CTAP: Modern Authentication |url=https://www.w3.org/Security/201812-Auth-ID/05_-_Day_1_-_Understanding_WebAuthn,_CTAP,_EAT,_FIDO_and_Authenticators.pdf |publisher=[[World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C) |accessdate=11 March 2019 |date=10 December 2018}}</ref>
On the client side, support for WebAuthn can be implemented in a variety of ways. The underlying cryptographic operations are performed by an [[authenticator]],<ref>{{cite web |last1=Stenius |first1=Petteri |title=Introduction to FIDO (Fast IDentity Online) |url=https://www.ubisecure.com/authentication/fido-introduction/ |publisher=Ubisecure |access-date=30 April 2019 |date=20 February 2019}}</ref> which is an abstract functional model that is mostly agnostic with respect to how the key material is managed. This makes it possible to implement support for WebAuthn purely in software, making use of a processor's [[trusted execution environment]] or a [[Trusted Platform Module]] (TPM). Sensitive cryptographic operations can also be offloaded to a roaming hardware authenticator that can in turn be accessed via [[USB]], [[Bluetooth Low Energy]], or [[near-field communication]]s (NFC). A roaming hardware authenticator conforms to the FIDO [[Client to Authenticator Protocol]] (CTAP),<ref name="FIDO-CTAP">{{cite web |editor1-last=Brand |editor1-first=Christiaan |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Ehrensvärd |editor3-first=Jakob |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=Michael B. |editor5-last=Kumar |editor5-first=Akshay |editor6-last=Lindemann |editor6-first=Rolf |editor7-last=Powers |editor7-first=Adam |editor8-last=Verrept |editor8-first=Johan |title=Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP) |url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-ps-20190130-pub/fido-client-to-authenticator-protocol-v2.0-ps-20190130.html |publisher=FIDO Alliance |access-date=7 March 2019 |date=January 30, 2019}}</ref> making WebAuthn effectively backward compatible with the FIDO [[Universal 2nd Factor]] (U2F) standard.<ref>{{cite web |title=WebAuthn / CTAP: Modern Authentication |url=https://www.w3.org/Security/201812-Auth-ID/05_-_Day_1_-_Understanding_WebAuthn,_CTAP,_EAT,_FIDO_and_Authenticators.pdf |publisher=[[World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C) |access-date=11 March 2019 |date=10 December 2018}}</ref>


Similar to legacy U2F, Web Authentication is resilient to verifier impersonation, that is, it is resistant to active man-in-the-middle-attacks,<ref>{{cite web |last1=Kan |first1=Michael |title=Google: Phishing Attacks That Can Beat Two-Factor Are on the Rise |url=https://www.pcmag.com/news/367026/google-phishing-attacks-that-can-beat-two-factor-are-on-the |publisher=PC Magazine |accessdate=8 March 2019 |date=March 7, 2019}}</ref> but unlike U2F, WebAuthn does not require a traditional password. Moreover, a roaming hardware authenticator is resistant to malware since the private key material is at no time accessible to software running on the host machine.
Similar to legacy U2F, Web Authentication is resilient to verifier impersonation, that is, it is resistant to active man-in-the-middle-attacks,<ref>{{cite web |last1=Kan |first1=Michael |title=Google: Phishing Attacks That Can Beat Two-Factor Are on the Rise |url=https://www.pcmag.com/news/367026/google-phishing-attacks-that-can-beat-two-factor-are-on-the |publisher=PC Magazine |access-date=8 March 2019 |date=March 7, 2019}}</ref> but unlike U2F, WebAuthn does not require a traditional password. Moreover, a roaming hardware authenticator is resistant to malware since the private key material is at no time accessible to software running on the host machine.


The WebAuthn Level&nbsp;1 standard was published as a W3C Recommendation on 4&nbsp;March 2019.<ref name="W3C-WebAuthn-Level-1">{{cite web |editor1-last=Balfanz |editor1-first=Dirk |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Hodges |editor3-first=Jeff |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=J.C. |editor5-last=Jones |editor5-first=Michael B. |editor6-last=Kumar |editor6-first=Akshay |editor7-last=Liao |editor7-first=Angelo |editor8-last=Lindemann |editor8-first=Rolf |editor9-last=Lundberg |editor9-first=Emil |title=Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials Level&nbsp;1 (latest) |url=https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-1/ |publisher=[[World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C) |accessdate=4 March 2019}}</ref><ref name="W3C-WebAuthn-announce">{{cite web |title=W3C and FIDO Alliance Finalize Web Standard for Secure, Passwordless Logins |url=https://www.w3.org/2019/03/pressrelease-webauthn-rec.html.en |publisher=[[World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C) |accessdate=4 March 2019 |date=4 March 2019}}</ref> A Level&nbsp;2 specification is under development.<ref name="W3C-WebAuthn-Level-2">{{cite web |editor1-last=Balfanz |editor1-first=Dirk |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Hodges |editor3-first=Jeff |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=J.C. |editor5-last=Jones |editor5-first=Michael B. |editor6-last=Kumar |editor6-first=Akshay |editor7-last=Lindemann |editor7-first=Rolf |editor8-last=Lundberg |editor8-first=Emil |title=Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials Level&nbsp;2 |url=https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/ |publisher=[[World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C) |accessdate=6 Jun 2019 |publication-date=4 Jun 2019 |edition=First Public Working Draft}}</ref>
The WebAuthn Level&nbsp;1 standard was published as a W3C Recommendation on 4&nbsp;March 2019.<ref name="W3C-WebAuthn-Level-1">{{cite web |editor1-last=Balfanz |editor1-first=Dirk |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Hodges |editor3-first=Jeff |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=J.C. |editor5-last=Jones |editor5-first=Michael B. |editor6-last=Kumar |editor6-first=Akshay |editor7-last=Liao |editor7-first=Angelo |editor8-last=Lindemann |editor8-first=Rolf |editor9-last=Lundberg |editor9-first=Emil |title=Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials Level&nbsp;1 (latest) |url=https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-1/ |publisher=[[World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C) |access-date=4 March 2019}}</ref><ref name="W3C-WebAuthn-announce">{{cite web |title=W3C and FIDO Alliance Finalize Web Standard for Secure, Passwordless Logins |url=https://www.w3.org/2019/03/pressrelease-webauthn-rec.html.en |publisher=[[World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C) |access-date=4 March 2019 |date=4 March 2019}}</ref> A Level&nbsp;2 specification is under development.<ref name="W3C-WebAuthn-Level-2">{{cite web |editor1-last=Balfanz |editor1-first=Dirk |editor2-last=Czeskis |editor2-first=Alexei |editor3-last=Hodges |editor3-first=Jeff |editor4-last=Jones |editor4-first=J.C. |editor5-last=Jones |editor5-first=Michael B. |editor6-last=Kumar |editor6-first=Akshay |editor7-last=Lindemann |editor7-first=Rolf |editor8-last=Lundberg |editor8-first=Emil |title=Web Authentication: An API for accessing Public Key Credentials Level&nbsp;2 |url=https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/ |publisher=[[World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C) |access-date=6 Jun 2019 |publication-date=4 Jun 2019 |edition=First Public Working Draft}}</ref>


== Background ==
== Background ==
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To initiate the WebAuthn authentication flow,<ref>{{cite web |url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |title=Web Authentication API  |at=Section&nbsp;[https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API#Authentication Authentication] |publisher=[[Mozilla]] |access-date=18 March 2019}}</ref> the WebAuthn Relying Party indicates its intentions to the WebAuthn Client (i.e., the browser) via [[JavaScript]]. The WebAuthn Client communicates with the authenticator using a JavaScript [[Application programming interface|API]] implemented in the browser. A roaming authenticator conforms to the FIDO [[Client to Authenticator Protocol]].
To initiate the WebAuthn authentication flow,<ref>{{cite web |url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |title=Web Authentication API  |at=Section&nbsp;[https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API#Authentication Authentication] |publisher=[[Mozilla]] |access-date=18 March 2019}}</ref> the WebAuthn Relying Party indicates its intentions to the WebAuthn Client (i.e., the browser) via [[JavaScript]]. The WebAuthn Client communicates with the authenticator using a JavaScript [[Application programming interface|API]] implemented in the browser. A roaming authenticator conforms to the FIDO [[Client to Authenticator Protocol]].


WebAuthn does not strictly require a roaming hardware authenticator. Alternatively, a software authenticator (implemented on a smartphone, e.g.) or a platform authenticator (i.e., an authenticator implemented directly on the WebAuthn Client Device) may be used. Relevant examples of platform authenticators include [[Windows Hello]]<ref>{{cite web |last1=Simons |first1=Alex |title=Secure password-less sign-in for your Microsoft account using a security key or Windows Hello |url=https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/blog/2018/11/20/sign-in-to-your-microsoft-account-without-a-password-using-windows-hello-or-a-security-key/ |publisher=[[Microsoft]] |accessdate=6 March 2019 |date=November 20, 2018}}</ref> and the [[Android operating system]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Android Now FIDO2 Certified, Accelerating Global Migration Beyond Passwords |url=https://fidoalliance.org/android-now-fido2-certified-accelerating-global-migration-beyond-passwords/ |publisher=[[FIDO Alliance]] |accessdate=6 March 2019 |location=BARCELONA |date=February 25, 2019}}</ref>
WebAuthn does not strictly require a roaming hardware authenticator. Alternatively, a software authenticator (implemented on a smartphone, e.g.) or a platform authenticator (i.e., an authenticator implemented directly on the WebAuthn Client Device) may be used. Relevant examples of platform authenticators include [[Windows Hello]]<ref>{{cite web |last1=Simons |first1=Alex |title=Secure password-less sign-in for your Microsoft account using a security key or Windows Hello |url=https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/blog/2018/11/20/sign-in-to-your-microsoft-account-without-a-password-using-windows-hello-or-a-security-key/ |publisher=[[Microsoft]] |access-date=6 March 2019 |date=November 20, 2018}}</ref> and the [[Android operating system]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Android Now FIDO2 Certified, Accelerating Global Migration Beyond Passwords |url=https://fidoalliance.org/android-now-fido2-certified-accelerating-global-migration-beyond-passwords/ |publisher=[[FIDO Alliance]] |access-date=6 March 2019 |location=BARCELONA |date=February 25, 2019}}</ref>


The illustrated flow relies on PIN-based user verification, which, in terms of usability, is only a modest improvement over ordinary password authentication. In practice, the use of [[biometric]]s for user verification can improve the usability of WebAuthn.{{Citation needed|date=March 2019}} The logistics behind biometrics are still poorly understood, however. There is a lingering misunderstanding among users that biometric data is transmitted over the network in the same manner as passwords, which is not the case.<ref>{{cite web |title=Touch ID and Beyond: Duo’s Plans for WebAuthn |url=https://duo.com/blog/touchid-webauthn |publisher=Duo Security |accessdate=8 March 2019 |date=5 March 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Steele |first1=Nick |title=How WebAuthn aims to solve the password problem |url=https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/02/27/webauthn-solve-password-problem/ |publisher=Help Net Security |accessdate=8 March 2019 |date=27 February 2019}}</ref>
The illustrated flow relies on PIN-based user verification, which, in terms of usability, is only a modest improvement over ordinary password authentication. In practice, the use of [[biometric]]s for user verification can improve the usability of WebAuthn.{{Citation needed|date=March 2019}} The logistics behind biometrics are still poorly understood, however. There is a lingering misunderstanding among users that biometric data is transmitted over the network in the same manner as passwords, which is not the case.<ref>{{cite web |title=Touch ID and Beyond: Duo’s Plans for WebAuthn |url=https://duo.com/blog/touchid-webauthn |publisher=Duo Security |access-date=8 March 2019 |date=5 March 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Steele |first1=Nick |title=How WebAuthn aims to solve the password problem |url=https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2019/02/27/webauthn-solve-password-problem/ |publisher=Help Net Security |access-date=8 March 2019 |date=27 February 2019}}</ref>


===Registration===
===Registration===
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To obtain a public key for the user, the WebAuthn Relying Party initiates a WebAuthn registration flow<ref>{{cite web |url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |title=Web Authentication API  |at=Section&nbsp;[https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API#Registration Registration] |publisher=[[Mozilla]] |access-date=18 March 2019}}</ref> that is very similar to the authentication flow illustrated above. The primary difference is that the authenticator now signs an attestation statement with its attestation private key. The signed attestation statement contains a copy of the public key that the WebAuthn Relying Party ultimately uses to verify a signed authentication assertion. The attestation statement also contains metadata describing the authenticator itself.
To obtain a public key for the user, the WebAuthn Relying Party initiates a WebAuthn registration flow<ref>{{cite web |url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |title=Web Authentication API  |at=Section&nbsp;[https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API#Registration Registration] |publisher=[[Mozilla]] |access-date=18 March 2019}}</ref> that is very similar to the authentication flow illustrated above. The primary difference is that the authenticator now signs an attestation statement with its attestation private key. The signed attestation statement contains a copy of the public key that the WebAuthn Relying Party ultimately uses to verify a signed authentication assertion. The attestation statement also contains metadata describing the authenticator itself.


The digital signature on the attestation statement is verified with the trusted attestation public key for that particular model of authenticator. How the WebAuthn Relying Party obtains its store of trusted attestation public keys is unspecified. One option is to use the FIDO metadata service.<ref>{{cite web |title=Metadata Service |url=https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/ |publisher=[[FIDO Alliance]] |accessdate=18 March 2019}}</ref>
The digital signature on the attestation statement is verified with the trusted attestation public key for that particular model of authenticator. How the WebAuthn Relying Party obtains its store of trusted attestation public keys is unspecified. One option is to use the FIDO metadata service.<ref>{{cite web |title=Metadata Service |url=https://fidoalliance.org/metadata/ |publisher=[[FIDO Alliance]] |access-date=18 March 2019}}</ref>


The attestation type specified in the JavaScript determines the trust model. For instance, an attestation type called self-attestation may be desired, for which the trust model is essentially [[trust on first use]].
The attestation type specified in the JavaScript determines the trust model. For instance, an attestation type called self-attestation may be desired, for which the trust model is essentially [[trust on first use]].
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== Support ==
== Support ==


The WebAuthn Level&nbsp;1 standard was published as a W3C Recommendation by the [[Web Authentication Working Group]] on 4&nbsp;March 2019.<ref name="W3C-WebAuthn-Level-1" /><ref name="W3C-WebAuthn-announce" /><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://venturebeat.com/2019/03/04/w3c-approves-webauthn-as-the-web-standard-for-password-free-logins/ |title=W3C Approves WebAuthn as the Web Standard for Password-Free Logins |last=Protalinski |first=Emil |date=March 4, 2019}}</ref> WebAuthn is supported by the following web browsers: [[Google Chrome]], Mozilla [[Firefox]], [[Microsoft Edge]], [[Safari (web browser)|Apple Safari]]<ref name="W3C-WebAuthn-announce" /> and the [[Opera web browser]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Can I use Web Authentication API? |url=https://caniuse.com/#feat=webauthn |accessdate=7 March 2019}}</ref>
The WebAuthn Level&nbsp;1 standard was published as a W3C Recommendation by the [[Web Authentication Working Group]] on 4&nbsp;March 2019.<ref name="W3C-WebAuthn-Level-1" /><ref name="W3C-WebAuthn-announce" /><ref>{{Cite web |url=https://venturebeat.com/2019/03/04/w3c-approves-webauthn-as-the-web-standard-for-password-free-logins/ |title=W3C Approves WebAuthn as the Web Standard for Password-Free Logins |last=Protalinski |first=Emil |date=March 4, 2019}}</ref> WebAuthn is supported by the following web browsers: [[Google Chrome]], Mozilla [[Firefox]], [[Microsoft Edge]], [[Safari (web browser)|Apple Safari]]<ref name="W3C-WebAuthn-announce" /> and the [[Opera web browser]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Can I use Web Authentication API? |url=https://caniuse.com/#feat=webauthn |access-date=7 March 2019}}</ref>


The desktop version of Google Chrome has supported WebAuthn since version&nbsp;67.<ref name="chrome-support">{{cite web |url=https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2018/05/webauthn |title=Enabling Strong Authentication with WebAuthn |first=Christiaan |last=Brand |website=Google Developers |date=2018-06-03 |accessdate=2018-06-25}}</ref> Firefox, which had not fully supported the previous FIDO U2F standard, included and enabled WebAuthn in Firefox version&nbsp;60, released on May&nbsp;9, 2018.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.cnet.com/news/firefox-moves-browsers-into-the-post-password-future-with-webauthn/ |title=Firefox moves browsers into post-password future with WebAuthn tech |first=Stephen |last=Shankland |website=CNET |date=2018-05-09 |accessdate=2018-05-11}}</ref> An early [[Windows Insider]] release of Microsoft Edge (Build&nbsp;17682) implemented a version of WebAuthn that works with both [[Windows Hello]] as well as external security keys.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://blogs.windows.com/windowsexperience/2018/05/31/announcing-windows-10-insider-preview-build-17682/#oHYCS0GkF95OMzKH.97 |title=Announcing Windows 10 Insider Preview Build 17682 |author=Sarkar |display-authors=etal |publisher=Microsoft |date=2018-05-23 |accessdate=2018-06-25}}</ref>
The desktop version of Google Chrome has supported WebAuthn since version&nbsp;67.<ref name="chrome-support">{{cite web |url=https://developers.google.com/web/updates/2018/05/webauthn |title=Enabling Strong Authentication with WebAuthn |first=Christiaan |last=Brand |website=Google Developers |date=2018-06-03 |access-date=2018-06-25}}</ref> Firefox, which had not fully supported the previous FIDO U2F standard, included and enabled WebAuthn in Firefox version&nbsp;60, released on May&nbsp;9, 2018.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.cnet.com/news/firefox-moves-browsers-into-the-post-password-future-with-webauthn/ |title=Firefox moves browsers into post-password future with WebAuthn tech |first=Stephen |last=Shankland |website=CNET |date=2018-05-09 |access-date=2018-05-11}}</ref> An early [[Windows Insider]] release of Microsoft Edge (Build&nbsp;17682) implemented a version of WebAuthn that works with both [[Windows Hello]] as well as external security keys.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://blogs.windows.com/windowsexperience/2018/05/31/announcing-windows-10-insider-preview-build-17682/#oHYCS0GkF95OMzKH.97 |title=Announcing Windows 10 Insider Preview Build 17682 |author=Sarkar |display-authors=etal |publisher=Microsoft |date=2018-05-23 |access-date=2018-06-25}}</ref>


Existing FIDO U2F security keys are largely compatible with the WebAuthn standard, though WebAuthn added the ability to reference a unique per-account "user handle" identifier, which older authenticators are unable to store.<ref name="W3C-WebAuthn" /> One of the first FIDO2-compatible [[authenticator]]s was the second-generation [[YubiKey|Security Key]] by Yubico, announced on April&nbsp;10, 2018.<ref>{{cite press release |url=https://www.yubico.com/press-releases/280530/ |title=Yubico Launches New Developer Program and Security Key for FIDO2 and WebAuthn W3C Specifications |date=2018-04-10 |accessdate=2018-05-11}}</ref>
Existing FIDO U2F security keys are largely compatible with the WebAuthn standard, though WebAuthn added the ability to reference a unique per-account "user handle" identifier, which older authenticators are unable to store.<ref name="W3C-WebAuthn" /> One of the first FIDO2-compatible [[authenticator]]s was the second-generation [[YubiKey|Security Key]] by Yubico, announced on April&nbsp;10, 2018.<ref>{{cite press release |url=https://www.yubico.com/press-releases/280530/ |title=Yubico Launches New Developer Program and Security Key for FIDO2 and WebAuthn W3C Specifications |date=2018-04-10 |access-date=2018-05-11}}</ref>


The first Security Level 2 certified FIDO2 key, called "Goldengate" was announced one year later by eWBM on April 8, 2019.<ref>{{cite press release |url=https://www.ewbm.com/press/pr2/ |title=eWBM: eWBM’s Goldengate Fingerprint Reader is First to Get FIDO L2 Certification |date=2019-04-08 |accessdate=2019-06-15}}</ref> and<ref>{{cite press release |url=https://mobileidworld.com/ewbm-goldengate-fingerprint-reader-fido-l2-certification-804084/ |title=Mobile ID World, Alex Perala: eWBM’s Goldengate Fingerprint Reader is First to Get FIDO L2 Certification |date=2019-04-09 |accessdate=2019-06-15}}</ref>
The first Security Level 2 certified FIDO2 key, called "Goldengate" was announced one year later by eWBM on April 8, 2019.<ref>{{cite press release |url=https://www.ewbm.com/press/pr2/ |title=eWBM: eWBM’s Goldengate Fingerprint Reader is First to Get FIDO L2 Certification |date=2019-04-08 |access-date=2019-06-15}}</ref> and<ref>{{cite press release |url=https://mobileidworld.com/ewbm-goldengate-fingerprint-reader-fido-l2-certification-804084/ |title=Mobile ID World, Alex Perala: eWBM’s Goldengate Fingerprint Reader is First to Get FIDO L2 Certification |date=2019-04-09 |access-date=2019-06-15}}</ref>


[[Dropbox (service)|Dropbox]] announced support for WebAuthn logins (as a 2nd factor) on May&nbsp;8, 2018.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://blogs.dropbox.com/tech/2018/05/introducing-webauthn-support-for-secure-dropbox-sign-in/ |title=Introducing WebAuthn support for secure Dropbox sign in |first=Brad |last=Girardeau |publisher=Dropbox |work=Dropbox Tech Blog |date=2018-05-08 |accessdate=2018-05-11}}</ref>
[[Dropbox (service)|Dropbox]] announced support for WebAuthn logins (as a 2nd factor) on May&nbsp;8, 2018.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://blogs.dropbox.com/tech/2018/05/introducing-webauthn-support-for-secure-dropbox-sign-in/ |title=Introducing WebAuthn support for secure Dropbox sign in |first=Brad |last=Girardeau |publisher=Dropbox |work=Dropbox Tech Blog |date=2018-05-08 |access-date=2018-05-11}}</ref>


[[Safari (web browser)|Apple Safari]] announced that [[Face ID]] or [[Touch ID]] could be used as a WebAuthn platform authenticator on June 24, 2020.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://developer.apple.com/documentation/safari-release-notes/safari-14-beta-release-notes |title=Safari 14 Beta Release Notes |first=Brad |last=Girardeau |publisher=Apple |work=Apple Developer Documentation |date=2020-06-24 |accessdate=2020-06-24}}</ref>
[[Safari (web browser)|Apple Safari]] announced that [[Face ID]] or [[Touch ID]] could be used as a WebAuthn platform authenticator on June 24, 2020.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://developer.apple.com/documentation/safari-release-notes/safari-14-beta-release-notes |title=Safari 14 Beta Release Notes |first=Brad |last=Girardeau |publisher=Apple |work=Apple Developer Documentation |date=2020-06-24 |access-date=2020-06-24}}</ref>


== API ==
== API ==


WebAuthn implements an extension of the W3C's more general [[Credential Management]] [[application programming interface|API]], which is an attempt to formalize the interaction between [[website]]s and [[web browser]]s when exchanging user credentials. The Web Authentication API<ref>{{cite web |title=Web Authentication API |url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |publisher=[[Mozilla]] |accessdate=16 March 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Ackermann |first1=Yuriy |title=Introduction to WebAuthn API |url=https://medium.com/@herrjemand/introduction-to-webauthn-api-5fd1fb46c285 |publisher=Medium |accessdate=8 March 2019 |date=15 January 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Stenius |first1=Petteri |title=Working with FIDO and the WebAuthn API |url=https://www.ubisecure.com/authentication/fido-webauthn-api/ |publisher=Ubisecure |accessdate=30 April 2019 |date=29 April 2019}}</ref> extends the Credential Management <code>navigator.credentials.create()</code> and <code>navigator.credentials.get()</code> [[JavaScript]] methods so they accept a <code>publicKey</code> parameter. The <code>create()</code> method is used for registering public key [[authenticator]]s as part of associating them with user accounts (possibly at initial account creation time but more likely when adding a new security device to an existing account) while the <code>get()</code> method is used for authenticating (such as when logging in).
WebAuthn implements an extension of the W3C's more general [[Credential Management]] [[application programming interface|API]], which is an attempt to formalize the interaction between [[website]]s and [[web browser]]s when exchanging user credentials. The Web Authentication API<ref>{{cite web |title=Web Authentication API |url=https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Web_Authentication_API |publisher=[[Mozilla]] |access-date=16 March 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Ackermann |first1=Yuriy |title=Introduction to WebAuthn API |url=https://medium.com/@herrjemand/introduction-to-webauthn-api-5fd1fb46c285 |publisher=Medium |access-date=8 March 2019 |date=15 January 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Stenius |first1=Petteri |title=Working with FIDO and the WebAuthn API |url=https://www.ubisecure.com/authentication/fido-webauthn-api/ |publisher=Ubisecure |access-date=30 April 2019 |date=29 April 2019}}</ref> extends the Credential Management <code>navigator.credentials.create()</code> and <code>navigator.credentials.get()</code> [[JavaScript]] methods so they accept a <code>publicKey</code> parameter. The <code>create()</code> method is used for registering public key [[authenticator]]s as part of associating them with user accounts (possibly at initial account creation time but more likely when adding a new security device to an existing account) while the <code>get()</code> method is used for authenticating (such as when logging in).


To check if a browser supports WebAuthn, scripts should check if the <code>window.PublicKeyCredential</code> interface is defined. In addition to <code>PublicKeyCredential</code>, the standard also defines the <code>AuthenticatorResponse</code>, <code>AuthenticatorAttestationResponse</code>, and <code>AuthenticatorAssertionResponse</code> interfaces in addition to a variety of dictionaries and other datatypes.
To check if a browser supports WebAuthn, scripts should check if the <code>window.PublicKeyCredential</code> interface is defined. In addition to <code>PublicKeyCredential</code>, the standard also defines the <code>AuthenticatorResponse</code>, <code>AuthenticatorAttestationResponse</code>, and <code>AuthenticatorAssertionResponse</code> interfaces in addition to a variety of dictionaries and other datatypes.
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== Reception ==
== Reception ==
In August 2018, Paragon Initiative Enterprises did a security audit of the WebAuthn standard. While they could not find any specific exploits, they revealed some serious weaknesses in the way the underlying cryptography is used and mandated by the standard.<ref name="paragon-blog">{{cite web|url=https://paragonie.com/blog/2018/08/security-concerns-surrounding-webauthn-don-t-implement-ecdaa-yet|title=Security Concerns Surrounding WebAuthn: Don't Implement ECDAA (Yet)|publisher=Paragon Initiative Enterprises Blog|date=2018-08-23|accessdate=2018-10-09}}</ref>
In August 2018, Paragon Initiative Enterprises did a security audit of the WebAuthn standard. While they could not find any specific exploits, they revealed some serious weaknesses in the way the underlying cryptography is used and mandated by the standard.<ref name="paragon-blog">{{cite web|url=https://paragonie.com/blog/2018/08/security-concerns-surrounding-webauthn-don-t-implement-ecdaa-yet|title=Security Concerns Surrounding WebAuthn: Don't Implement ECDAA (Yet)|publisher=Paragon Initiative Enterprises Blog|date=2018-08-23|access-date=2018-10-09}}</ref>


The main points of criticism revolve around two potential issues that were problematic in other cryptographic systems in the past and therefore should be avoided in order to not fall victim to the same class of attacks:
The main points of criticism revolve around two potential issues that were problematic in other cryptographic systems in the past and therefore should be avoided in order to not fall victim to the same class of attacks:


* Through the mandated use of COSE (RFC 8152) WebAuthn also supports [[RSA (cryptosystem)|RSA]] with [[PKCS 1|PKCS1v1.5 padding]]. This particular scheme of padding is known to be vulnerable to [[Adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack|specific attacks]] for at least twenty years and it has been successfully attacked in other protocols and implementations of the RSA cryptosystem in the past. It is difficult to exploit under the given conditions in the context of WebAuthn, but given that there are more secure cryptographic primitives and padding schemes, this is still a bad choice and is not considered to be best practice among cryptographers any more.
* Through the mandated use of COSE (RFC 8152) WebAuthn also supports [[RSA (cryptosystem)|RSA]] with [[PKCS 1|PKCS1v1.5 padding]]. This particular scheme of padding is known to be vulnerable to [[Adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack|specific attacks]] for at least twenty years and it has been successfully attacked in other protocols and implementations of the RSA cryptosystem in the past. It is difficult to exploit under the given conditions in the context of WebAuthn, but given that there are more secure cryptographic primitives and padding schemes, this is still a bad choice and is not considered to be best practice among cryptographers any more.
* The FIDO Alliance standardized on the [[public-key cryptography|asymmetric cryptographic]] scheme [[ECDAA]].<ref name="ecdaa-spec">{{cite web|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/fido-ecdaa-algorithm-v2.0-id-20180227.html|title=FIDO ECDAA Algorithm|publisher=FIDO Alliance|date=2018-02-27|accessdate=2018-10-09}}</ref> This is a version of [[Direct Anonymous Attestation|direct anonymous attestation]] based on [[elliptic curve]]s and in the case of WebAuthn is meant to be used to verify the integrity of authenticators, while also preserving the privacy of users, as it does not allow for global correlation of handles. However, ECDAA does not incorporate some of the lessons that were learned in the last decades of research in the area of [[Elliptic-curve cryptography|elliptic curve cryptography]], as the chosen curve has some security deficits inherent to this type of curve, which reduces the security guarantees quite substantially. Furthermore, the ECDAA standard involves random, non-deterministic, signatures, which already has been a problem in the past.
* The FIDO Alliance standardized on the [[public-key cryptography|asymmetric cryptographic]] scheme [[ECDAA]].<ref name="ecdaa-spec">{{cite web|url=https://fidoalliance.org/specs/fido-v2.0-id-20180227/fido-ecdaa-algorithm-v2.0-id-20180227.html|title=FIDO ECDAA Algorithm|publisher=FIDO Alliance|date=2018-02-27|access-date=2018-10-09}}</ref> This is a version of [[Direct Anonymous Attestation|direct anonymous attestation]] based on [[elliptic curve]]s and in the case of WebAuthn is meant to be used to verify the integrity of authenticators, while also preserving the privacy of users, as it does not allow for global correlation of handles. However, ECDAA does not incorporate some of the lessons that were learned in the last decades of research in the area of [[Elliptic-curve cryptography|elliptic curve cryptography]], as the chosen curve has some security deficits inherent to this type of curve, which reduces the security guarantees quite substantially. Furthermore, the ECDAA standard involves random, non-deterministic, signatures, which already has been a problem in the past.


Paragon Initiative Enterprises also criticized how the standard was initially developed, as the proposal was not made public in advance and experienced cryptographers were not asked for suggestions and feedback. Hence the standard was not subject to broad cryptographic research from the academic world.
Paragon Initiative Enterprises also criticized how the standard was initially developed, as the proposal was not made public in advance and experienced cryptographers were not asked for suggestions and feedback. Hence the standard was not subject to broad cryptographic research from the academic world.
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Despite these shortcomings, Paragon Initiative Enterprises still encourage users to continue to use WebAuthn but have come up with some recommendations for potential implementors and developers of the standard that they hope can be implemented before the standard is finalized. Avoiding such mistakes as early as possible would prevent the industry from any challenges that are introduced by broken standards and the need for [[Backward compatibility|backwards compatibility]].
Despite these shortcomings, Paragon Initiative Enterprises still encourage users to continue to use WebAuthn but have come up with some recommendations for potential implementors and developers of the standard that they hope can be implemented before the standard is finalized. Avoiding such mistakes as early as possible would prevent the industry from any challenges that are introduced by broken standards and the need for [[Backward compatibility|backwards compatibility]].


ECDAA was only designed used in combination with device attestation. This particular feature of WebAuthn is not necessarily required for authentication to work. Current implementations allow the user to decide whether an attestation statement is sent during the registration ceremony. Independently, relying parties can choose to require attestation or not. ECDAA was removed from WebAuthn Level 2 as it was not implemented by browsers nor relying parties.<ref>{{Cite web|last=|first=|date=2020-04-28|title=Remove ECDAA? · Issue #1410 · w3c/webauthn|url=https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/1410|url-status=live|archive-url=|archive-date=|access-date=2020-06-03|website=GitHub|language=en}}</ref>
ECDAA was only designed used in combination with device attestation. This particular feature of WebAuthn is not necessarily required for authentication to work. Current implementations allow the user to decide whether an attestation statement is sent during the registration ceremony. Independently, relying parties can choose to require attestation or not. ECDAA was removed from WebAuthn Level 2 as it was not implemented by browsers nor relying parties.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2020-04-28|title=Remove ECDAA? · Issue #1410 · w3c/webauthn|url=https://github.com/w3c/webauthn/issues/1410|access-date=2020-06-03|website=GitHub|language=en}}</ref>


== References ==
== References ==