WebAuthn: Difference between revisions

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WebAuthn by design solves many of the inherent issues of password-based authentication:
WebAuthn by design solves many of the inherent issues of password-based authentication:


* As the private part of a credential is automatically generated using a sane algorithm with sane parameters and randomness, and stored in a trusted authenticator, the following issues disappear:
* Credentials are automatically generated using a sane algorithm with sane parameters and randomness, and stored in a trusted authenticator. As such, the following issues disappear:
** Easily bruteforceable passwords due to insufficient length.
** Easily bruteforceable passwords due to insufficient length.
** Easily guessable passwords by dictionary attacks (e.g., "password", "12345678", etc.).
** Easily guessable passwords by dictionary attacks (e.g., "password", "12345678", etc.).
** Easily guessable passwords by social engineering (e.g., date of birth, home address, etc.).
** Easily guessable passwords by social engineering (e.g., date of birth, home address, etc.).
** Inadequate password storage on the client side (e.g., written on a post-it note, in a book, in the mobile phone contact list, etc.).
** Inadequate client-side password storage (e.g., written on a post-it note, in a book, in the mobile phone contact list, etc.).
** Password reusal for different websites, as different credentials are automatically created for different websites.
** Password reusal for different websites, as any credential is specific to a certain website by design.
** The need for servers to enforce minimum criteria for passwords while not limiting usability.
** Servers setting inadequate (e.g., too lax) or too restrictive mimimum criteria for passwords.
** Servers setting arbitrary and inadequate restrictions on the maximum length of passwords and the allowed charset.
** Servers setting arbitrary and inadequate restrictions on the maximum length of passwords and/or allowed charset.
** Servers hindering the use of password managers by disabling auto-fill capabilities in web forms.
* As the private part of a credential is never stored on a database on a server, the following issues disappear:
* As the private part of a credential is never stored on a database on a server, the following issues disappear:
** Inadequate password storage in databases (e.g., plaintext, or using weak or insecure algorithms or constructions).
** Inadequate password storage in databases (e.g., plaintext, or using weak or insecure algorithms or constructions).
** Potential databases leaks exposing passwords.
** Potential databases leaks exposing passwords.
** Servers mandating useless password rotations every few months.
* As credentials are different for every website, the following issues disappear:
* As credentials are different for every website, the following issues disappear:
** Credential stuffing attacks that combine database leaks with the common practice of reusing passwords for multiple websites.
** Credential stuffing attacks that combine database leaks with the common practice of reusing passwords for multiple websites.
** Phishing attacks, as the user verification process never involves credentials for the wrong website.
** Phishing attacks, as credentials cannot be selected for the wrong website by design.


== Overview ==
== Overview ==