WebAuthn: Difference between revisions
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WebAuthn by design solves many of the inherent issues of password-based authentication: | WebAuthn by design solves many of the inherent issues of password-based authentication: | ||
* | * Credentials are automatically generated using a sane algorithm with sane parameters and randomness, and stored in a trusted authenticator. As such, the following issues disappear: | ||
** Easily bruteforceable passwords due to insufficient length. | ** Easily bruteforceable passwords due to insufficient length. | ||
** Easily guessable passwords by dictionary attacks (e.g., "password", "12345678", etc.). | ** Easily guessable passwords by dictionary attacks (e.g., "password", "12345678", etc.). | ||
** Easily guessable passwords by social engineering (e.g., date of birth, home address, etc.). | ** Easily guessable passwords by social engineering (e.g., date of birth, home address, etc.). | ||
** Inadequate password storage | ** Inadequate client-side password storage (e.g., written on a post-it note, in a book, in the mobile phone contact list, etc.). | ||
** Password reusal for different websites, as | ** Password reusal for different websites, as any credential is specific to a certain website by design. | ||
** | ** Servers setting inadequate (e.g., too lax) or too restrictive mimimum criteria for passwords. | ||
** Servers setting arbitrary and inadequate restrictions on the maximum length of passwords and | ** Servers setting arbitrary and inadequate restrictions on the maximum length of passwords and/or allowed charset. | ||
** Servers hindering the use of password managers by disabling auto-fill capabilities in web forms. | |||
* As the private part of a credential is never stored on a database on a server, the following issues disappear: | * As the private part of a credential is never stored on a database on a server, the following issues disappear: | ||
** Inadequate password storage in databases (e.g., plaintext, or using weak or insecure algorithms or constructions). | ** Inadequate password storage in databases (e.g., plaintext, or using weak or insecure algorithms or constructions). | ||
** Potential databases leaks exposing passwords. | ** Potential databases leaks exposing passwords. | ||
** Servers mandating useless password rotations every few months. | |||
* As credentials are different for every website, the following issues disappear: | * As credentials are different for every website, the following issues disappear: | ||
** Credential stuffing attacks that combine database leaks with the common practice of reusing passwords for multiple websites. | ** Credential stuffing attacks that combine database leaks with the common practice of reusing passwords for multiple websites. | ||
** Phishing attacks, as | ** Phishing attacks, as credentials cannot be selected for the wrong website by design. | ||
== Overview == | == Overview == | ||