Hardware keylogger

Revision as of 15:34, 27 January 2008 by wikipedia>CliffC (Reverted edits by 24.57.98.42 (talk) to last version by Grue.z)

Hardware Keyloggers can be used for keystroke logging. They plug in between a computer keyboard and a computer and log all keyboard activity on an internal memory. They are typically designed to have an innocuous appearance that blends in with the rest of the hardware. For example, Keyghost markets one that is "injection moulded to look exactly like an EMC Balun"[1], and most competing keyloggers (e.g. KeyDevil, KeeLoggers, KeyKatcher, Amecisco, etc.) have a similar design.

They are designed to work with PS/2 keyboards, and more recently with USB keyboards.

Hardware keyloggers have an advantage over software keyloggers as they begin logging from the moment a computer is turned on (and are therefore able to collect a BIOS password for instance), and do not require software installation (unlike software solutions).

How do they work? [2]

All hardware keyloggers have to have the following:

  • A microcontroller - this interprets the datastream between the keyboard and computer, processes it, and passes it to the non-volatile memory
  • A non-volatile memory device, such as Flash - this stores the recorded data, even when power is lost

On the whole the recorded data is retrieved by typing a special password into a computer text editor. As the hardware keylogger is plugged in-between the keyboard and computer, it detects the password has been typed and then starts presenting the computer with "typed" data to produce a menu. Beyond text menu some keyloggers offer a high-speed download to speed up retrieval of stored data, this can be via USB mass-storage enumeration or with a USB or serial download adapter.

Countermeasures

Denial of physical access to sensitive computers, e.g. by locking the server room, is the most effective means of preventing hardware keylogger installation. Visual inspection is the primary means of detecting hardware keyloggers, since there are no known methods of detecting them through software. In cases in which the CPU is hidden from view (e.g. at some public access kiosks where the CPU is in a locked box and only a monitor, keyboard, and mouse are exposed to view), a user might thwart a keylogger by typing part of a password, using the mouse to move to a text editor or other window, typing some garbage text, mousing back to the password window, typing the next part of the password, etc. so that the keylogger will record an unintelligible mix of garbage and password text[3] See also Keystroke logging(Non-technological methods).

The main risk associated with keylogger use is that physical access is needed twice: initially to install the keylogger, and secondly to retrieve it. Thus, if the victim discovers the keylogger, they can then set up a sting operation to catch the person in the act of retrieving it. This could include surveillance or the use of automated security methods (e.g. Datawatch access card swipe records) to determine who gained physical access to the area during the time period that the keylogger was removed.

References